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The purpose of this research was to examine the effectiveness of the TAiwan Civil
Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) system for maintenance personnel to improve
aircraft safety. The research evaluated what are the issues that affect the participation of
the TACARE system. The understandings of the safety culture for maintenance personnel
in Taiwan were also analyzed. The research was conducted with a mixed method. The
survey and interview were developed to sample the acceptance and opinions regarding
the TACARE system for the maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Statistical analysis of the
data from 605 survey respondents and 9 interviewees concluded the maintenance
personnel in Taiwan lacked the necessary knowledge of voluntary safety reporting. The
results yielded the agreement with importance of promoting voluntary safety reporting
programs in Taiwanese aircraft maintenance industry.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Safety has always been a concern in the inherently high-risk aviation industry. In
the Bird Triangle theory, Figure 1 shows that accidents have been rare. However, there
have been many errors and incidents that preceded these infrequent major accidents. For
every major accident, there were 15 minor accidents and 300 incidents. The goal of
voluntary reporting is to prevent a tragic fatal accident by means of gathering, analyzing,
and propagating these 300 incidents and even more safety related issues through the,
reports and share them with the entire aviation community (McVenes & Chidester, 2005).

1
15

1 major accident
15 minor accidents
with damage and injury
300 incidents and
"near misses"

15,000

15.000 observed
work error*

V

Hazardous E\ents
Figure 1. The Bird Triangle (Adapted from McVenes & Chidester, 2005).
"While fatal accidents are extremely rare and incidents of injury and minor
damage occur occasionally, near-misses and work errors can take place on a daily basis"
(McVenes & Chidester. 2005. p. 305). Most of these were unobserved and unreported,
but they are still environmental threats or operating errors. However, the) can lead to a
fatal accident under the right circumstances. If those errors can be significantly reduced.
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then the accident rate can also be reduced.
Before voluntary safety programs were implemented, information about hazards
and safety problems became available only after an accident occurred. This reactive
method has become inadequate for further safety improvements in the aviation industry.
Voluntary safety reporting programs have enabled the airline industry to detect hazards
and vulnerabilities in the air transportation system. Reports gathered from front-line
employees have increased the possibility of seeing not only what happened, but also why
it happened (Yeh, 2009). According to the statistical data from the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA), voluntary incident reporting programs, such as the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), have
discovered 90% of the problems which are previously unknown to the air carrier industry
or the FAA (Farrow, 2009). As a result, safety recommendations have been generated
from the information in those incident reports and helped to reduce the accident rate. The
mean to enhance aviation safety has now transformed from accident investigations
(reactive) to voluntary reporting (proactive and predictive).

Background of the Problem
Human errors have become the primary threat to aviation safety. Human factors
have been involved with approximately 80% of jet aircraft accidents. Meanwhile,
maintenance errors have contributed to 15% of commercial jet aircraft accidents (Boeing
Company, n.d.). In addition to the flight crew, maintenance has become the second
highest contributor to aircraft accidents. Frequently, maintenance mistakes and errors are
almost undetectable and uncorrectable until the next inspection, or problems are
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experienced later during the flight (Patankar & Taylor, 2004a). Therefore, most of the
safety issues remained unseen by others until an accident or incident occurs.
Human errors in maintenance not only lead to fatal accidents, but also add costs to
air carrier operations. According to one study, 20-30% of in-flight engine shutdowns and
50% of delays and cancellations are caused by human errors. Meanwhile, 48,800
non-airworthy aircraft are dispatched each year as a result of maintenance errors. The
cost of flight cancellations and delays is steep. The cancellation of a commercial flight
can cost an airline $50,000. The average cost for the aircraft to return to the gate is •
$15,000, and the average ground damage incident costs $70,000. One airline estimates
$100 million a year is lost, and the total lost revenue from ramp accidents is $2.5 billion
annually (Boquet, 2009).
The voluntary reporting systems for aircraft maintenance, such as the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), have
been successful in the United States. They accumulate two thousand reports from aircraft
maintenance personnel every year (FAA, 2009). These safety programs for aircraft
maintenance are considered effective tools to enhance aviation safety. On the contrary,
Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council (ASC), which is similar to the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), has suffered from insufficient incident reports in its voluntary
safety reporting system, known as the TAiwan Civil Aviation safety REporting
(TACARE) system.
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Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness and acceptance of the
TACARE system for maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Taiwan's ASC established a
voluntary reporting program for its civil aviators in 1999, known as the TACARE
system. To date, this system has accumulated a minimal number of incident reports from
maintenance personnel. Accordingly, this study has been designed to address the need for
voluntary incident reports concerning civil aircraft maintenance in Taiwan.

Significance of the Problem
Statistics of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA, n.d.) in Taiwan show
there are 2,210 certified mechanics in Taiwan. However, only a small number of them
from air carriers and maintenance facilities participate in the TACARE system. This
study examined the safety culture among Taiwanese maintenance personnel, and
identified factors affecting the TACARE system.
Maintenance personnel's perceptions contribute to the effectiveness of the
voluntary safety reporting system, TACARE. Certain cultural personalities of the
Taiwanese maintenance personnel, company policies, and aviation regulations have been
major influences in an effective aviation safety reporting system. To improve the
acceptance of voluntary reporting programs in the Taiwanese aviation industry, the
effectiveness of the U.S. voluntary aviation safety reporting system (such as ASRS and
ASAP) was compared to the TACARE system.
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Delimitations
This study discussed the importance of establishing voluntary safety reporting
programs and integrating the concept of just culture among the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan. Due to the sensitive nature of the data that have been received in the programs,
de-identified examples have been utilized to illustrate different factors that may have
been encountered in the real environment of the Taiwan aviation industry. The existing
TACARE program has been addressed in the current study to evaluate the acceptance of
voluntary reporting, but this research does not conduct a cost-effective analysis of the
system.

Definition of Terms
Aviation Safety Council (ASC): An independent investigation agency in Taiwan. Its
function is the same as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the United
States (U.S.). The ASC is the agency in charge of the voluntary reporting system,
TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting system (TACARE).
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP): One of the United States Federal Aviation
Administration's voluntary safety programs. This is a self disclosure program utilized by
air carrier and repair station employees.
Effectiveness: The degree to which implementing the voluntary safety programs in the
Taiwan air carrier industry yields desired safety outcomes.
Event Review Committee (ERC): The ERC is responsible for reviewing and analyzing all
ASAP reports that are submitted. It is also in charge of deciding what reports qualify for
ASAP, identifying problems and risks from the reports, and providing solutions for those
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problems and risks (FAA, 2002).
TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting system (TACARE): A voluntary reporting
system in Taiwan designed to invite flight crews, maintenance personnel, air traffic
controllers, and the general public to report irregular events and hazards in the course of
normal flight operations.
Safety Management System (SMS): A process-driven and proactive program that
continuously collects and analyzes sizable volumes of data, providing a principled basis
for the definition of activities and the allocation of resources to address safety concerns in
a proactive manner (Galotti, Rao, & Maurino, 2006).
Just Culture: People recognize that although punishment serves little purpose from a
safety perspective, punitive action may be necessary in some circumstances, and there is
a need to define the line between acceptable and unacceptable actions.
Major Accident: An accident in which a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was destroyed, there were
multiple fatalities, or there was one fatality and a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was substantially
damaged (NTSB, 2010).
Incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an
aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations (NTSB, 2010).
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Chapter II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Accidents in commercial aviation have traditionally been viewed and treated as
events where lessons could be learned to improve future safety. However, these lessons
have often been learned with an unacceptable price -the loss of life. Today, even though
the safety of aviation has been improved dramatically, maintenance errors have still
caused several fatal accidents and incidents in recent years. Those accidents and other
incidents raise public concerns on the airworthiness of the aircraft.

Maintenance Related Accidents
In the U.S., the most recent, catastrophic accident that involved maintenance
problems was Alaska Airlines Flight 261 on January 31, 2000. Due to the malfunction of
the jackscrew of the vertical tail trim system, the MD-83 jet plunged uncontrollably into
the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California (NTSB, 2002). A
series of factors contributed to the failure of the jackscrew. Inadequate lubrication of the
jackscrew which was caused by the extension of the lubrication interval was the main
cause of the accident. However, the airline also failed to address several related problems,
such as (a) imprecise procedures, (b) poor training, and (c) lack of supervision. The
continuous negligence of improper maintenance actions resulted in the loss of 88 lives.
In Taiwan, there was one fatal accident and one incident which involved
maintenance errors in the last 10 years. One of most serious accidents in Taiwan's
aviation history was China Airlines Flight 611. On May 25, 2002, due to improper repairs
and inspection from a previous accident, in which the airplane had a tail strike 20 years

earlier, the Boeing 747-200 airplane broke up over the Taiwan Strait while cruising at
35,000 feet (ASC, 2002). This was due to an improper repair which did not follow the
correct instructions from the manufacturer. As a result of this, and over 20 years of wear
on the aircraft, a structure failure in the tail section occurred. The aircraft disintegrated in
the air and resulted in the loss of 225 people on board. In 2006, the 84-year-old former
China Airlines engineer conducting this repair was being prosecuted for negligent
homicide (United Daily News, 2006).
Another incident that recently occurred also involved maintenance errors. On
August 20, 2007, a Boeing 737-800 operated by China Airlines landed and taxied into the
apron at Naha Airport. Due to the detached downstop assembly from the slat track, when
the slat was retracted, the component punctured a hole in the fuel tank. Fuel that was
leaking from the fuel tank caught fire and the aircraft was engulfed inflames(JTSB,
2009). The aircraft was badly damaged and destroyed by fire. Fortunately, all 165 people
on board were evacuated from the aircraft and there were no fatalities or injuries. Due to
the design fault of the assembly, the assembly was not able to be maintained and repaired
properly. Neither the manufacturer nor the airlines had addressed this issue sufficiently.
Also, both the maintainer and supervisor who perform the maintenance on the assembly
did not report any difficulty on that task.
From ASC statistics, there have been five fatal accidents involving Taiwanese air
carriers from 1998 to 2007. As previously mentioned, one resulted from maintenance
errors; hence, maintenance errors were causal in 20% of Taiwan's fatal aircraft accidents
during the 10-year period. This figure does not include incidents or near-misses.
Countless maintenance problems have cost human lives and revenue, yet the safety
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standards in maintenance are not followed. Therefore, human errors in aircraft
maintenance need to be addressed in order to prevent more accidents.

Human Factors in Aircraft Maintenance
Human factors in aviation has traditionally concentrated on aircrew and air traffic
control errors, but the increasing number of maintenance and inspection errors has
contributed to the rise of human factors research and interventions in this area. James T.
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (1997; Figure 2) demonstrated that a series of inadequate
maintenance actions will result in a fatal accident. Consequently, the study of
maintenance errors as precursors to incidents and accidents has become essential.

Figure 2. The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation (Adapted from Reason, 1997).
Since the objective of voluntary incident reporting is to analyze and prevent
incidents and accidents, it is critical for voluntary safety programs to conduct continuous
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reviewing processes to identify potential hazards to flight safety. Human error models
and taxonomies have facilitated the identification of human factors problem areas as well
as provided a basis for the development of tailored intervention strategies. For
maintenance errors, two major models to identify and analyze the problem are the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and Dupont's Dirty Dozen.

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
The Swiss Cheese model of accident causation is a model used in the risk analysis
and management of human systems. It was originally set out by James T. Reason in 1990.
Drawing upon Reason's (1990) concept of latent and active failures, the HFACS
describes four levels of failure: (a) unsafe acts, (b) preconditions for unsafe acts, (c)
unsafe supervision, and (d) organizational influences (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Unsafe acts can be classified into two categories: errors and violations (Reason,
1990). Errors represent the mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve
their intended outcome. Violations, on the other hand, refer to the willful disregard for
the rules and regulations that govern the safety offlight.The categories of errors and
violations expand further to include three basic error types: (a) skill-based, (b) decision,
and (c) perceptual and two forms of violations: routine and exceptional (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003). Unsafe acts can be directly linked to nearly 80 % of all aviation
accidents (Boeing, n.d.). One of the most noticeable problems is simply "human error."
Those errors in operations are mostly caused by latent conditions in the organization.
Within the preconditions level, there are three contributing factors: (a) condition
of operators, (b) personal factors, and (c) environmental factors. The condition of
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operators does influence performance on the job. In this category, there are three types of
conditions: (a) adverse mental states, (b) adverse physiological states, and (c)
physical/mental limitations. Those factors affect human performance (i.e., fatigue and
disorientation). Personal factors refer to preconditions for unsafe acts that are created by
people, such as communication skills. They have been divided into two general
categories: Crew Resource Management (CRM) and personal readiness. Environmental
factors (i.e., noise and automation) can also contribute to the substandard conditions of
operators and hence to unsafe acts. They can be identified within two categories: physical
and technological (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Reason (1990) also traced the causal chain of events back up the supervisory
chain of command. HFACS has identified four categories of unsafe supervision: (a)
Inadequate Supervision refers to the failure of supervisor to provide guidance, training
opportunities, leadership, and motivation, as well as the proper role model to be emulated;
(b) Planned Inappropriate Operations means that individuals are put at unacceptable risk,
crew rest is jeopardized, and ultimately performance is adversely affected; (c) Failed to
Correct a Known Problem refers to those instances when deficiencies among individuals,
equipment, training or other related safety areas are "known" to the supervisor, yet are
allowed to continue unabated; and (d) Supervisory Violations are reserved for those
instances when existing rules and regulations are willfully disregarded by supervisors
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). A typical example in this level is the accident of Alaska
261, which was caused by inappropriate inspection.
For Organizational Influences, decisions of upper-level management directly
affect supervisory practices, as well as the conditions and actions of operators. The most
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elusive of latent failures revolve around issues related to (a) Resource Management, (b)
Organizational Climate, and (c) Operational Process. Resource Management
encompasses the realm of corporate-level decision making regarding the allocation and
maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources and equipment.
Organizational Climate is defined as the situation-based consistencies in the
organization's treatment of individuals. Operational Process refers to corporate decisions
and rules that govern the activities within an organization, including the establishment
and use of standardized operating procedures and formal methods for maintaining *
oversight between the workforce and management (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). One
of the organizational influences is the chain of command in the military, which often
causes accidents by following superior's orders unquestionably.
HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory and practice by providing
investigators with a comprehensive, user-friendly tool for identifying and classifying the
human causes of aviation accidents. The ultimate goal is to reduce the aviation accident
rate through systematic, data-driven investment.

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - Maintenance Extension
Similar to the original Reason's Swiss Cheese model (1997), the HFACS Maintenance Extension (ME) consists of four error categories: (a) Management
Conditions, (b) Maintainer Conditions, (c) Working Conditions, and (d) Maintainer1 Acts.
Management Conditions that cause active failures includes both organizational and
supervisory. Maintainer Conditions that can contribute to an active failure include
medical, crew coordination, and readiness. Working Conditions that can contribute to an
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active failure include environmental, equipment, and workspace. Management,
Maintainer, and Working Conditions are latent factors that can impact a maintainer's
performance and can contribute to an active failure, an unsafe Maintainer Act. Unsafe
Maintainer Acts (errors and violations) may lead directly to a mishap (Schmidt, Lawson,
& Figlock, n.d.).
HFACS-ME is effective in capturing the nature of and relationships among latent
conditions and active failures. It captures factors leading to maintenance error from a
systematic approach. The insights gained provide a solid perspective for the development
of potential intervention strategies (Schmidt et al., n.d.).

The Dirty Dozen
Besides the HFACS, the Dirty Dozen illustrates the contributing factors for
human behaviors. In 1993, Transport Canada developed a series of training courses for
mechanics, which would serve to reduce maintenance errors with Dr. Gordon Dupont. In
close collaboration with the aviation industry, Transport Canada and Dr. Dupont
subsequently identified 12 issues in maintenance errors, known as the Dupont's Dirty
Dozen (1997). The following illustrates those 12 factors in detail (Dupont, 2009):
1. Lack of communication - It is simply the failure to exchange information. In
good communication, the mental pictures must match.
2. Complacency - This is where someone becomes so self-satisfied that a person
can lose awareness of dangers. It is also called overconfidence as people
become more proficient at what they do.
3. Lack of knowledge - With constantly changing technology, this contributor to
an error is more common than people think. It also refers to a lack of training
to perform certain tasks.
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4. Distraction - It is anything that takes someone's mind off the job at hand even
for an instant. Any distraction can cause people to think further ahead than
they should.
5. Lack of teamwork - The larger an organization becomes, the more common
this contributing factor is. Because teamwork is constantly evolving and
changing, it is hard to gain and very easy to lose.
6. Fatigue - It is insidious, and the person fails to realize just how much his/her
judgment is impaired until it is too late.
7. Lack of resources - Using improper equipment to safely carry out a task has
caused many fatal accidents.
8. Pressure - To be on time is ever-present in the aviation industry. Often,
technicians have to rush to finish jobs.
9. Lack of assertiveness - In failing to speak up when things do not seem right has
resulted in many fatal accidents. Assertiveness also calls for listening to the
views of others before making a decision.
10. Stress - It is the subconscious response to the demands placed upon a person.
Everyone experiences stresses at work. It is not all bad until it becomes
excessive, and people become distressed.
11. Lack of awareness - It occurs when there is a lack of alertness and vigilance
in observing. This usually occurs with very experienced persons who fail to
reason out possible consequences to what may normally be a good practice.
12. Norms - It is the short term for "normal," or the way things actually are done
around an organization. Norms are unwritten rules followed or tolerated by
the majority of a group. Negative norms are those that detract from an
established safety standard.
Since the development of the Dirty Dozen, maintenance personnel at most of the
air carriers have routinely received training to recognize the Dirty Dozen and prevent
their occurrence. However, the Dirty Dozen puts more emphasis individual performance
rather than the entire organization. It only can identify the causes of maintainer's unsafe
acts and preconditions.
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Voluntary Incident Reporting
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13 (2001) Chapter 8
Section 8.2 recommends that "A State should establish a voluntary incident reporting
system to facilitate the collection of information that may not be captured by a mandatory
incident reporting system." Section 8.3 (p. 8-1) expounds that "A voluntary incident
reporting system shall be non-punitive and afford protection to the sources of the
information." The FAA also characterizes voluntary incident reporting as follows: (a)
involve partnership and trust between regulator and regulated, (b) require some form of
data collection, analysis and corrective action, and (c) program oversight from a single
authority that specializes in voluntary programs (Farrow, 2010).
The main idea of reporting is to contribute to organizational learning. It is to help
prevent recurrence by making systemic changes that aim to address some of the basic
circumstances in which work went awry (Dekker, 2007). In aviation maintenance, safety
is dependent on technical reliability of the hardware and human reliability of the
maintenance personnel. Voluntary incident reporting programs acknowledge the
complexity of this human-machine interface as well as the human relationships involved
and provide a mean to address errors that impact the overall safety of aviation
maintenance (FAA, 2009). Voluntary incident reporting programs have become valuable
sources to study the human factors concerning aviation safety, especially maintenance
where the problems often cannot be seen through inspections or self audits.
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Aviation Safety Reporting System
In 1974, Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 514 had an accident in which the
aircraft descended below the minimum safe attitude specified for the area in which it was
flying and crashed into a Virginia mountain top. Only 6 weeks before the TWA crash, a
United Airlines crew had narrowly escaped the same fate utilizing the same approach and
location. The problem with approach procedure and the differences in its interpretation
between pilots and controllers were brought into United's internal reporting system called
Flight Safety Awareness Program. If this incident report had been shared industry wide,
the TWA accident may have been prevented (NASA, 1986).
After TWA Flight 514's fatal accident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
instituted the voluntary ASRS program on April 30, 1975, designed to encourage the
identification and reporting of deficiencies and discrepancies in the system (FAA, 1997).
The U.S. was one of the first nations to develop a voluntary incident reporting program.
ASRS was established under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the FAA
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This cooperative safety
reporting program invites pilots, controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel,
and other users of the National Airspace System (NAS), or any other person, to report to
NASA actual or potential discrepancies and deficiencies involving the safety of aviation
operations. Based on information obtained from this program, the FAA will take
corrective action as necessary to remedy defects or deficiencies in the NAS. The reports
may also provide data for improving the current system and planning for a future system
(FAA, 1997).
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One of the most critical aspects for a successful incident reporting system is the
protection of the participating parties. Incidents would not be reported by individuals
unless they were protected from disciplinary and regulatory punishment. As a result, Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 91.25 prohibits the use of any reports
submitted to NASA under ASRS in any disciplinary action, except information
concerning criminal offenses. In addition to the protection provided by Part 91.25, ASRS
has established a comprehensive immunity program that provides total confidentiality for
the reporting parties (FAA, 1997). The ASRS, however, has limitations concerning*
immunity. Immunity can be provided to a reporter when: (a) the contributor has filed an
ASRS form within 10 days of the incident, (b) the reporter could not have been involved
in a reckless operation, gross negligence, or willful misconduct, and (c) the violation did
not result in an accident (NASA, 1986).
Since 1975, the ASRS has accepted over 500,000 reports and received
approximately 47,000 reports each year; 60% of reports werefiledfromASAP reports
(Farrow, 2010). The ASRS has collected the data and contributed to the enhancement and
improvement of aviation safety throughout the U.S. It also has been internationally
recognized as a strong contributor to aviation safety. With the success of the ASRS, the
FAA has introduced several voluntary safety programs that have proved to be effective
afterward.

Aviation Safety Action Program
The ASAP was developed to further analyze the individual carriers' operations.
Similar to its NASA counterpart, ASAP provides a platform whereby employees of
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participating air carriers and repair station certificate holders can identify and report
safety issues to management and to the FAA for resolution. These programs are designed
to encourage participation from various employee groups, such as flight crewmembers,
mechanics, flight attendants, and dispatchers (FAA, 2002).
The objective of the ASAP has been to encourage air carrier and repair station
employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying
potential precursors to accidents (FAA, 2002). Four challenges in implementing the
ASAP have been (a) recognizing contributing factors, (b) analyzing a high volume of
data, (c) following through on actions beyond correcting individuals, and (d) providing
operational feedback and publications (Chidester, 2003).
To date, there have been 151 programs for pilots, maintenance personnel,
dispatchers, and flight attendants across 69 operators. Those programs receive 45,000
reports annually. Among them, there are 42 maintenance ASAPs, which receives about
2,000 reports from maintenance personnel in the U.S every year. In contrast with ASAP,
ASRS has been the all-inclusive reporting program. Anyone involved in U.S. aviation
can report into the program or extract information out of the program. On the other hand,
the ASAP has been action-oriented. Individual and organizational concerns and events
can be tightly monitored and controlled because only one organizational entity has been
involved (Farrow, 2010).
An ASAP program is dependent on employee-management trust. The ASAP
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishes the basic agreement between
employees, management, and the regulator. The MOU establishes corporate commitment
and serves as a foundational reference in the event of challenging cases. This document
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needs to be co-developed by the company and employee representatives. The MOU
include the voluntary disclosure policy to encourage employees of air carriers
participating in the programs to disclose information which may include possible
violations of Title 14 CFR Part 91.25 without fear of punitive enforcement sanctions or
company disciplinary action. Events report under a program that involves an apparent
violation of the regulations on the part of air carriers is handled under the MOU (FAA,
2002).
Since ASAP's goal is to analyze and prevent incidents and accidents, it is critical
to conduct continuous reviewing processes to identify potential hazards to flight safety.
This is accomplished with an Event Review Committee (ERC). The ERC may share and
exchange information and identify actual or potential safety problems from the
information contained in the reports. The ERC is usually comprised of a management
representative from the certificate holder, a representative from the employee labor
association (if applicable), and a specially qualified FAA inspector (FAA, 2002). Its
principal function has been to conduct scheduled meetings to evaluate each ASAP report
on a case-by-case basis. The ERC must achieve consensus on every event. The methods
that the ERC utilize to determine whether to include or exclude an ASAP report is
detailed in Figure 3. These meetings identify the hazards and assured that every
corrective action is implemented to mitigate the reported hazard.
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ASAP Report Process Chart (AC 120-6SB)
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Similar to other confidential and voluntary safety reporting programs, ASAP
provides incentives to employees to report safety events and alleged violations. The
incident must be unintentional and has to be reported in a timely manner (e.g. 24 hours).
It does not appear to involve an intentional disregard for safety, which involves (a)
criminal activity, (b) substance abuse, (c) controlled substances, (d) alcohol, and (e)
intentional falsification.
The ASAP incident reports have been categorized as sole-source and
non-sole-source reports. The FAA (2002) has defined a sole-source report as a report in
which all evidence of the event has been discovered by the single report. Upon
acceptance into the ASAP database, the participants in a sole-source event would receive
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either a response from the ASAP ERC or an FAA Letter of No Action, where a 14 CFR
violation has been identified. No FAA action would be applied if the reports were
sole-source reports (Farrow, 2010). A non-sole-source report has been defined as a report
in which the event was not reported by only one of the individual reporting parties.
Non-sole-source reports involving possible 14 CFR violations have resulted in the FAA
issuing a Letter of Corrections (FAA, 2002). The reports have usually been archived in a
database for future references in a two year period.
Typically, about 70% of the ASAP reports cause a procedural change at the task
level. For example, task cards or job cards are changed using an existing or a new
document change process. About 25% of the time, the ASAP reports cause a change
across the organization. This means the document change process itself might be
changed, impacting all future document change requests. About 5% of the time, the
ASAP reports cause an industry-wide change. For example, the report may result in a
Service Bulletin or an Airworthiness Directive that impacts other organizations (FAA,
2009). ASAP has proven to be a successful safety program for each individual air carrier.

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system
From the birth of proactive safety programs, there has been the assumption that
information gained from one operator in one program would be integrated with others.
The result would be a greater understanding of the issues and risks under study (Stolzer,
Halford, & Goglia, 2008). With the vision for industry wide collaboration and the legal
protection of information in place, the FAA and the aviation community have initiated a
safety analysis and data sharing collaboration to proactively analyze broad and extensive
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data to advance aviation safety, known as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing (ASIAS).
The initiative leverages internal FAA datasets, airline safety data, publicly
available data, manufacturers' data and other data. The airline safety data is being
safeguarded by the MITRE Corporation, in a de-identified manner to foster broad
participation and engagement (CAST, n.d.). The contractor, known as the MITRE
Corporation, serves as a neutral third party to perform the data collection and analysis
processes. ASIAS fuses various aviation data sources in order to proactively identify
safety trends and to assess the impact of changes in the aviation operating environment. It
is designed to address the following issues in the past: (a) fragmentation of safety data
and information, (b) difficult access problems, (c) lack of data standards, (d) data quality
deficiencies, (e) lack of analytical tools and methodologies, and (f) need to develop
diagnostic and prognostic analytical (Pardee, 2008). The two components of this activity
are the Analysis of aggregate data and the Sharing of information.
The resources of ASIAS include both public and non-public aviation data. Public
data sources include, but are not limited to, air traffic management data related to traffic,
weather, and procedures. Non-public sources include de-identified data from aircraft
operators, including digital flight data and safety reports submitted by flight crews.
Future plans include the addition of de-identified reports from maintenance and dispatch
personnel, flight attendants, and air traffic controllers. Governance agreements with
participating operators and owners of specific databases provide ASIAS analysts with
access to safety data without having to archive sensitive proprietary information centrally
(CAST, n.d.).
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ASIAS has been developed and collaborated with 13 major air carriers, such as
American, Delta, and Continental. It establishes key safety benchmarks so that individual
operators may assess their own safety performance against the industry as a whole. A
partnership between the industry and the regulator is also established, which is the Civil
Aviation Safety Team (CAST). The CAST and ASIAS are closely cooperating with each
other to implement the preventive or corrective actions in the industry from the results of
those analyses (CAST, n.d.). With the efforts of ASIAS and CAST, an industry-wide
consensus is built to support the Safety Management System (SMS).

Safety Management System (SMS)
SMS is an organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary
organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. ICAO's Standards
and Recommended Practices require that States establish a "safety program" to achieve
an acceptable level of safety in aviation operations. The acceptable level of safety shall
be established by the State(s) concerned (ICAO, 2006). 1CAO initiated provisions of the
Safety Management System (SMS) in November, 2006. Air carriers, airdrome operators,
and maintenance organizations around the world are required to implement SMS (Galotti,
Rao, & Maurino, 2006).
The performance-based approaches to the management of safety have been
demonstrated by SMS. The brief definition of SMS can be described as "a dynamic risk
management system based on quality management system (QMS) principles in a
structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety culture
environment" (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 18-19). Any SMS-type system has also been
regarded as a dynamic risk management system. Using the Risk Matrix, shown in Figure
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4, the approach allows the employees and management to consider the risks of not
implementing a particular safety intervention — the cost of the intervention could be
measured against the cost of the event (the likelihood of occurrence of the event and the
severity of the event). The assessment provides a guideline for mitigating actions and
allowable timelines for corrective and preventive actions (Stolzer et al., 2008). The
organization is able to allocate its resources to eliminate the highest risk index first.
Through this process, risks can be managed within an acceptable parameter in the most
cost effective way.

Figure 4 Risk Matrix (Adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008)
In FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-92, the SMS is structured upon four basic
components of safety management: (a) safety policy, (b) safety risk management (SRM),
(c) safety assurance, and (d) safety promotion (FAA, 2006). Thus, an SMS is functioning
effectively when all four structural elements exist and are being executed. The four
principles are also known as "Four Pillars" in FAA AC 120-92. Figure 5 shows how the
Four Pillars act as the foundation of SMS and support the success of a SMS. With the
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Four Pillars, an SMS can be applied in building a healthy safety culture (Stolzer et al.,
2008).

Figure 5. Four Pillars of SMS. (Adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008)
Safety Policy
An SMS must first define its policies, procedures, and organizational structures,
which describe responsibility, authority, accountability, and expectations (Stolzer et al,
2008). Under the broad umbrella of the SMS program, the aviation organization could
make a commitment to the employees across the company that the voluntary safety
reporting will be carefully considered using the SRM approach and appropriate feedback
will be provided to all reports. Organizational safety culture will be assessed regularly
and specific improvement efforts will be implemented; employee and management
evaluation and reward systems will incorporate adequate support for SMS (FAA, 2009).
The main idea is that in companies where management is truly committed to
enhancing safety as a core business activity, employees will not be afraid of pointing out
their safety deficiencies. This requires a change in the way that people think about safety
It is often referred to as a collective perception and culture. Although culture cannot be
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regulated or implemented in the way that more concrete systems and regulations may be,
management philosophy can be conveyed by unambiguous terms throughout an
organization (Galotti et al., 2006). With the safety policy in place, it would create an
environment which favors the improvement of safety.

Safety Risk Management (SRM)
A formal system of hazard identification and SRM is essential in controlling risk
to acceptable levels. The SRM component of the SMS is based upon the system safety
process model (FAA, 2008). The SRM process provides objective means of assessing
safety risks. It is the core function of SMS, which is to identify and control hazards. This
process could be incorporated in the voluntary safety reporting programs so that all
recommendations coming from the incident reports consider the risk aspects, severity and
likelihood, prior to making recommendations. Subsequently, if the recommendation for a
particular change is not accepted by the company management, a corresponding SRM
rationale could be provided by the management.
Figure 6 shows the basic flow of information through an SMS Risk Control
Process, which explains the task loop to control risks in detail. The process and
information flow is designed to identify latent or unrecognized unsafe conditions and
analyze them for impact on the organization so that actions can be taken to adequately
control those conditions. Most importantly, this SRM process requires information to be
obtained from all kinds of sources, such as audits and voluntary safety programs. In order
to assess and manage risks, it is essential for SMS to collect data and go through the SRM
process continuously.
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Figure 6 Risk Control Process of SMS. (Adapted from Stolzer et al, 2008)
Safety Assurance
Once SRM is implemented, the operator must ensure it is continuously practiced
and continue to be effective in a changing environment. The safety assurance function
provides for this using quality management concepts and processes. The safety risk
management and safety assurance processes are integrated in the SMS. The safety risk
management process provides for initial identification of hazards and assessment of risk.
Organizational risk controls are developed and, once they are determined to be capable of
bringing the risk to an acceptable level, they are employed operationally. The safety
assurance function takes over at this point to ensure that the risk controls are being
practiced and they continue to achieve their intended objectives. This system also
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provides for assessment of the need for new controls because of changes in the
operational environment (FAA, 2008). Tracking the changes accomplished as a direct
result of those voluntary safety programs would be the best way to meet this SMS
requirement. Such actions should document the evidence of organizational change as well
as emphasis on systematic solutions and the shift toward a safety culture (FAA, 2009).

Safety Promotion
The safety promotion pillar has had as an objective to create a safety culture,
which would begin at the top of the organization with the incorporation of policies and
procedures that could cultivate a reporting culture and a Just Culture. To support a
reporting culture, the organization must cultivate the willingness of its employees to
contribute to the organization's understanding of its operation. Since the most valuable
reports have evolved to self-disclosure of mistakes, the organization must make the
commitment to act in a non-punitive manner when those mistakes were not the result of
careless or reckless behavior. An SMS can provide a company with mechanisms for
allowing employees to submit reports on safety deficiencies without fear of reprisal. It
should also generate robust mechanisms to disseminate information to its workforce. As a
result, each employee could have timely access to safety-related information, since the
data would have no value unless an organization could learn from it in time to avoid a
mistake. An SMS should be a closed-loop system, in which an audit trail can exist
whereby a discovery in the risk assessment and analysis process may lead to causal
analysis that would be used in a preventive and corrective action process to modify the
operations and reduce risks (Stolzer, et al., 2008).
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Implementation
SMS has not only been assisting the FAA in maintaining the voluntary reporting
programs that have been operated effectively and efficiently in the U.S., but have also
been conducted in other countries. Transport Canada committed to the implementation of
the SMS in aviation organizations in 2005. Europe and New Zealand have moved
forward with the SMS more quickly than the U.S. (Stolzer et al., 2008). Taiwan also has
mandated Taiwanese air carriers to implement the SMS as of January 1, 2009 (CAA, AC
120-32B, 2007). Although Taiwanese aviation authorities have put the SMS into practice,
one of its fundamental elements, safety culture, has experienced difficulty for acceptance
of the program in the Taiwan aviation industry due to the nature of the national culture.
The question now is how to get the maintenance organizations in Taiwan to comply with
ICAO's requirement for safety programs.

Safety Culture
Culture is defined as the values, belief, and norms shared of a group of people that
influence the way they behave (FAA, 2008). Human beings are all influenced by cultural
issues. The various cultures set boundaries for acceptable behavior and provide a
framework for decision making. A safety culture is the "engine" that continues to drive
the organization towards the goal of maximum attainable safety. It can be divided into
two parts. The first comprises the beliefs, attitude, and values (often unspoken) of an
organization's membership regarding the pursuit of safety. The second is concrete and
embraces the structures, practices, controls, and policies that an organization possesses
and employs to achieve greater safety (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Safety culture is
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regarded as a fusion of the following elements:
1. Just Culture: A concept that people are encouraged, and even rewarded, for
providing essential safety-related information. There is a clear line that
differentiates between acceptable and unacceptable behavior (Stolzer et al.,
2008).
2. Reporting Culture: Aims to create a comfortable environment for people to
acknowledge any safety deficiency in the organization. The information
would be de-identified and protected by separated authority. People are*
prepared and easy to report their errors and experiences (Reason & Hobbs,
2003).
3. Learning Culture: Is used to guide continuous and wide-reaching system
improvements rather than mere local fixes. Under learning culture, people
have the willingness and the competence to draw conclusions from safety
information systems and the will to implement major reforms (Reason &
Hobbs, 2003).
These subcomponents of a safety culture (a Just Culture, a reporting culture, and a
learning culture) would need to work together to create an informed culture, which in
most respects, has been regarded as a key element to a safety culture (Stolzer et al.,
2008). It lets everybody have the knowledge about the human, technical, organizational
and environmental factors that determine the safety of the system as a whole. People
would know where the "edge" is without having to fall over it.
Organizational psychologists tell us that there are three distinct cultural
environments that we need to understand: (a) national culture encompasses the value of
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particular nations, (b) organizational/corporate culture differentiates the behavior found
in various organizations, and (c) professional behavior differentiates the behavior found
in different professional groups (Stolzer et al., 2008).
Voluntary safety programs are generally impeded by many difficulties, such as
trustiness of confidentiality, punishment, and personal identity, etc. Establishing a safety
culture in the organization is essential for safety improvements. If people do not trust the
organization that is operating the reporting system, the systems will not succeed. As the
China Airlines Flight 611 case shows, Taiwan's aviation industry strongly addressed the
punishment and blame culture. Because of the traditions in Chinese culture, it is hard to
establish a Just Culture, the most important foundation in safety culture (Stolzer et al.,
2008).

Social Culture
China is one of the oldest civilizations in mankind's history. In Chinese history,
people lived in union and were governed by emperors. Even though there have not been
emperors in China during the past 100 years, certain perspectives of Chinese culture
persist (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). The dimensions of social culture were first defined by
Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (1978). His study demonstrates that there are national and
regional cultural groupings that affect the behavior of societies and organizations. Mainly,
there are four dimensions of culture differences, which include (a) power distance (PD),
(b) individualism-collectivism (IC), (c) uncertainty avoidance (UA), and (d) masculinity.
PD is defined as how the less powerful members of institutions and organizations
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Low PD accepts power relations
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that are more consultative or democratic. People relate to one another more as equals
regardless of formal positions. Subordinates are more comfortable with and demand the
right to contribute to and critique the decision making of those in power. On the contrary,
high PD means less powerful accept power relations that are more autocratic and
paternalistic. Subordinates acknowledge the power of others simply based on where they
are situated in certain formal, hierarchical positions (Hofstede, 2001). As a result, the low
or high PD alters the chain of command in an organization. In high PD, superiors have
the full authority and may become "error-free." Inadequate decision making and "no
questions asked" philosophy could end up with a disaster. In low PD, people tend to
become reckless about superiors' instructions.
In Chinese culture, there is a high PD. Authoritarianism is a characteristic based
on 5,000 years of dictatorship. It has a large amount of influence within society. Figures
of authority, such as professors, managers, and airline captains, are treated with a great
amount of respect by their subordinates. Chinese subordinates treat their superiors with
high respect, regardless of the environment and conditions. This relationship between
superiors and subordinates routinely exists beyond the working environment. An example
is that eye contact with figures of authorities is acceptable and is encouraged for
subordinates in the Western cultures. In contrast, Chinese cultures consider that a
subordinate making an eye contact with afigureof authority is disrespectful; therefore,
the action is strongly discouraged and avoided. In addition, there has been a common
belief that a figure of authority is error-free. This belief has led figures of authorities not
to allow challenges or questions. Superiors will not admit their errors, and the primary
result is that they might have fear of losing jobs. As a result, the responsibility of the
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subordinate is to preserve the superiors' face, which is regarded as one's dignity and
prestige, thereby maintaining the harmony of the group (Lee & Weitzel, 2005).
As for IC, individualism is contrasted with collectivism, and refers to the extent to
which people are expected to stand up for themselves and to choose their own
affiliations, or alternatively act predominantly as a member of a group or organization.
Asian and Latin American cultures rank among the most collectivist in this category,
while Anglo countries such as the United States, Great Britain and Australia are the most
individualistic cultures (Hofstede, 2001). People in an individualist culture may becDme
over-confident of themselves and take risky actions. On the other hand, people in a
collectivist culture rarely express their individual opinions during social activities, such
as conferences and lectures. This may become a latent risk in aviation safety when people
fail to report a problem (Lee & Weitzel, 2005).
Chinese culture is characterized by its strong emphasis on collectivism, and the
principle of individualism in most western cultures dislikes that in the Chinese culture. In
general, Chinese consider the implications of their behavior in aframeworkof concern
extending beyond their immediate family. Thus, people in a collectivist culture often
behave in relation to their family or organization. As a result, this characteristic of
Chinese culture has led Chinese children to be taught to listen and not to speak at a young
age and speak only when spoken to. Nevertheless, human society is formed as a group
and can function well, but it relies heavily on individual performance. One of the main
components to maintain the function of the society is the harmony of the group, which is
usually the priority concern. Therefore, they are not dependent upon themselves, but the
society. This may become a latent risk in aviation safety (Lee & Weitzel, 2005).
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UA reflects the extent to which members of a society attempt to cope with anxiety
by minimizing uncertainty. Cultures that scored high in UA prefer rules (e.g. about
religion and food) and structured circumstances, and employees tend to remain longer
with their present employer. Mediterranean cultures, Latin America, and Japan rank the
highest in this category (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, these uncertainties often cause
misunderstandings between people, and may lead to miscommunication and lack of
communication at work.
The social pressure in Chinese culture leads to UA and also evolves into a
"shame" culture. The Chinese are more sensitive to pressure from society rather than an
individual's internal pressure and feelings. The society is heavily ruled and structured in
both written and unwritten ways. In contrast, many other cultures emphasize honor
systems or codes of honor. The measurements are commonly based on one's feelings of
guilt and have to be conducted in accordance with one's own judgment. The honor
system, however, cannot be applied to the Chinese culture. As a result, most Chinese
grow up and are affected by social pressure. In general, the honor system in Chinese is
determined by one's belief system (Lee & Weitzel, 2005).
Masculinity versus its opposite, femininity, refers to the distribution of roles
between the genders which is another fundamental issue for any society to which a range
of solutions are found. Masculine cultures value competitiveness, assertiveness, ambition,
and the accumulation of wealth and material possessions, whereas feminine cultures
place more value on relationships and quality of life (Hofstede, 2001). Due to the
difference on valuing daily life, this characteristic in the culture may lead a person to
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become aggressive or passive at work. Consequently, that may result in a lack of
assertiveness, leadership, and situational awareness.
Based on 5,000 years of empire history, males usually rule the society, and
females are less empowered. The rights for males and females are imbalanced. Although
the situation has changed dramatically since democracy was introduced, males are still
more career motivated than females. That affects their jobs, especially in the aviation
industry, which is considered a highly technical field.

Just Culture
Voluntary incident reporting usually involves the air carriers, authorities, and
employees. Getting people to report is about building trust. Trust that the information
provided in good faith will not be used against those who reported it. Keeping up the
reporting rate is also about trust, but it is even more about involvement, participation, and
empowerment (Dekker, 2007). Therefore, a Just Culture needs to be established within an
organization in order to set a comfortable climate (confidential and non-punitive cultures)
for the voluntary incident reporting program.
The foundation of the Four Pillars of SMS, present in all the voluntary safety
programs, cannot stand without the support of a Just Culture. These programs cannot be
run effectively without a Just Culture as a basis for establishing a reporting climate. Just
Culture has promoted an atmosphere of mutual trust that would encourage voluntary
reporting. When an employee has been motivated to report work errors (other than
intentional, reckless, or the result of an accident), the organization has benefited from a
safety point of view. Not all employees have embraced the idea of voluntary reporting.
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Dekker (2007) pointed out that "the main reason has been that reporting could be risky.
Many things can be unclear:
1. How exactly will the supervisor, the manager, the organization respond?
2. What are the rights and obligations of the reporter?
3. Will the reported information stay inside of [sic] the organization? Or will other
parties (media and prosecutor) have access to it? " (p. 41).
The reporting individual may have no faith that anything meaningful would be
done with what he or she reported. This issue may be more significant in Asian countries
with a solid Chinese culture. Therefore, the aviation industry in Taiwan is experiencing
the hardship of building a Just Culture and transitioning from less willingness for
reporting to a voluntary safety reporting program.
Getting people to report has been difficult. Keeping up the reporting rate once the
system has been instituted is equally challenging. An effective reporting culture depends
on how the organization can handle blame and punishment. Reason (1997) has defined
Just Culture as "an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, even rewarded,
for providing essential safety-related information, but in which they are also clear about
where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior," (p. 195);
Just Culture has been the ultimate concept underpinning the maintenance and
effectiveness of a voluntary reporting system. Just Culture has also been a tool for
improving safety by knowing how to reconcile accountability for failure with learning
from that failure - with the aim of continuing to make progress on safety (Dekker, 2007).
Figure 7 shows that, in Just Culture, it is unacceptable to punish all errors and
unsafe acts regardless of their origins and circumstances. It is, however, equally
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unacceptable to give blanket immunity from sanctions for all actions that could contribute
to organizational accidents/incidents. One of the difficulties of managing the application
of Just Culture is focused in discriminating between truly "bad behavior," and the vast
majority of unsafe acts to which the attribution of blame has been neither appropriate nor
useful (Reason, 1997).

SMS addresses honest mistakes for the
single purpose of improving safetv
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Figure 7. The Concepts of Just Culture (Adapted from Cioponea, 2007, slide 3).

The Just Culture Community (2006) categorized the four evils of human
behaviors (human errors, negligent conduct, reckless conduct, and knowing violations) to
assist the industry in determining whether behaviors can be assigned a degree of risk, or
not. Nevertheless, it also illustrated that knowing violations may fall into either at-risk or
reckless behavior based on the individual's perception. Psychological and legal issues
should be taken into consideration when making the judgment.
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Dekker (2007) pointed out that engineering a Just Culture relies upon the
following three central questions:
1. Who in the organization or society gets to draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable behavior?
2. What and where should the role of domain expertise be in judging whether
behavior is acceptable or unacceptable?
3. How protected against judicial interference are safety data (either the safety
data from incidents inside of [sic] the organization or the safety data that come
from formal accident investigation)? (p. 119)
These questions are difficult to answer definitely, since influences from countries,
organizations, and professions may lead to multiple avenues of approach toward
establishing a Just Culture. Although establishing a Just Culture within any voluntary
safety programs might have difficulties and depend upon differences of national culture,
Just Culture appears to some as two separate concepts - "Justice" and "Culture."
Although the concepts of justice and culture have basically been fixed and are not
malleable, a relationship between them could be fashioned to meet any particular needed
mindset. Dekker (2007) introduced four steps regarding how to build a Just Culture.
These steps illustrated in Figure 8 demonstrate how airlines and aviation authorities can
implement Just Culture to establish a level of trust that would be necessary to enhance the
effectiveness of voluntary safety reporting programs. The ultimate goal of adopting Just
Culture in many Eastern countries could eliminate cultural discrepancies and its
influences.
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Figure 8. Approaches to Build a Just Culture (Adapted from Dekker, 2007, p. 138).
The fourth step (agree on who draws the line in each country), utilized for
establishing an effective safety reporting program/system, however, needs to be
implemented by agreement between the aviation authority, the airline, and the union.
Since most Asian countries such as Taiwan do not have regulations addressing immunity,
the fear of disciplinary actions from the governmental authority and from the airline may
reduce the employees' trust in a safety reporting program and his/her willingness to
participation in reporting. Without the immunity agreement, building a thoroughly Just
Culture cannot be achieved.
The importance of securing the free flow of information to determine the cause of
incidents affects the prevention of future accidents and incidents. What people should
focus on is determining contributing factors and producing preventive methods, instead
of a criminal punishment to employees.

40

Maintenance Resource Management
Following Crew Resource Management (CRM), the first generation of
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) was developed in 1989 after the Aloha
Airlines accident (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b). MRM is a general process for improving
communication, effectiveness and safety in aircraft maintenance operations. As much as
CRM was created to address safety and teamwork issues in the cockpit, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), in conjunction with industry partners, developed MRM
to address teamwork deficiencies within the aviation maintenance environment (FAA,
2000).
MRM is often referred to as a training program, but MRM is much more than
training. It is a tool to provide individuals and groups with the skills and processes to
manage errors that are within their control, such as communication, decision-making,
situation awareness, workload management, and team building. Part of MRM is training,
but part of it must be the application and management of the attitude, skills, and
knowledge that training and behavior can provide (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b).
Today, the fourth generation of MRM programs have taken root. It is
characterized by a commitment to long-term communication and behavioral change in
maintenance. The emergence of MRM should be more than awareness training or coping
skills. It is the conscious process of increasing trust among maintainers, their managers,
and their regulators that enable them to learn from present behaviors in order to improve
quality and efficiency. It is the process of cultural change (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b).
The fourth generation MRM programs are being designed and implemented from
a systematic perspective. The airline operators are aware of the interpersonal trust issues
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that impede self-disclosure, and they are striving to incorporate a Maintenance Error
Investigation module in their training so that the participants understand the procedure of
such investigation (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b). In other words, today's MRM has applied
incident reports as part of training material. To reduce maintenance errors, an air carrier
must have a safety program similar to the ASRS and ASAP to gain more knowledge from
voluntary incident reports while MRM is being implemented into the maintenance
organization.

Taiwanese Civil Aviation Authorities
In Taiwan, the civil aviation authorities are almost equivalent to the authorities in
the U.S. The Taiwanese Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) is the regulatory and
administration agency, which is the same as the FAA. Regulations and documentation
also follow the same safety standards compared to the U.S. The CAA also has a
mandatory reporting system for aviation occurrences. Meanwhile, the Aviation Safety
Council (ASC) serves as an independent investigation agency which is similar to the
functions of NTSB. It provides a voluntary incident reporting program, known as the
TACARE system.

Civil Aeronautics Administration
The Civil Aviation Act in Taiwan was passed on May 30, 1953. This Act was
enacted to ensure aviation safety, a sound civil aviation system, compliance with
international civil aviation standards, and promote the development of civil aviation
(CAA, 2009). Following the guideline from the Organization Act, the Civil Aeronautics
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Administration (CAA) was established under the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (MOTC) to administer affairs relating to civil aviation.
The Taiwanese CAA has the same functions as the FAA, which are promoting
and regulating civil aviation. The mission statement of the CAA illustrates three
objectives: (a) meet the travel and transport demand of the public, (b) promote the
development of aviation industry, and (c) build an environment of co-existence and
co-prosperity. The actions toward these missions are (a) implementing flight safety
systems, (b) expanding civil aviation activities, (c) promoting airport construction,'(d)
enhancing service quality, and (e) fostering civil aviation elites (CAA, 2009).
To insure the airworthiness of the aircraft, the CAA provides mandatory oversight
function in aircraft maintenance, which includes the rules governing (a) classification of
ratings, (b) inspection procedures manuals, (c) maintenance records, (d) maintenance
facilities, (e) equipment, (f) parts and qualification of personnel, (g) the establishment of
maintenance and quality assurance systems, and (h) application for certification, revision
of ratings, issuance, cancellation and renewal. To comply with the Civil Aviation
Regulations, the owner or operator of an aircraft with an airworthiness certificate shall
maintain the aircraft in accordance to regulations. A repair station that performs the
maintenance applies to the CAA for certification, and then a certificate will be issued
upon certification. The CAA shall send its personnel to inspect the repair station with
regard to personnel, facilities and operations. Those being inspected shall not refuse,
avoid or obstruct such inspections. If the maintenance status does not meet airworthiness
and safety requirements, the aircraft shall be grounded and its airworthiness certificate be
revoked (CAA, 2009).
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In addition to the regulatory certification and inspection, similar to other countries,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) in Taiwan has a mandatory flight
occurrence reporting system. Most information received by the system fall into the
category of serious aviation occurrences.

Aviation Safety Council
On February 16, 1998, China Airlines flight 676, an Airbus A300-600R crashed
while conducting a go-around from Runway 5L at Taipei/Taiwan Taoyuan (previously
Chang Kai-Shek) International Airport (CAA, 2000). Following that accident, the ASC
was established in May 1998 to be an independent government agency in aviation
accident investigation, with the purpose of analyzing causal factors and proposing flight
safety recommendations.
Based on Taiwan's Civil Aviation Regulation, Articles 84 and 87, the birth of
ASC was officially declared on May 25, 1998 as an independent council, reporting
directly to the Premier's office. ASC perform its duties by makingfindingsas to the
causes and contributing factors through rigorous and systematic air accident
investigations, and then propose safety recommendations. The Aviation Occurrence
Investigation Act was also proposed and implemented to address the rules of accident
investigation. The sole objective of the accident investigations is to improve Taiwan's
aviation safety, instead of apportioning blame or responsibilities, which is in full
compliance with 1CAO Annex 13 (ASC, n.d.b).
ASC consists of seven board members, including a chairman, whom are all
appointed by the Premier. Regular meetings take place once a month, and additional ones
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can be called upon by the chairman when deemed necessary. The main structure of ASC
is comprised of the (a) Occurrence Investigation Division, (b) Flight Safety Division, (c)
Investigation Laboratory, and (d) Legal and Administrative Division. The Managing
Director is assigned by the chairman and takes full responsibility for the office operations
(ASC, n.d.b). The organization chart is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. The Organization Chart of ASC. (Adapted from ASC, n.d.b)
One of the key function of the ASC lies in the flight safety division. It conducts
research regarding aviation occurrence prevention and safety recommendation
implementation, including the following: (a) established flight safety data base for safety
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trend analysis, (b) safety recommendations implementation, (c) safety research, (d)
TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) system, (e) establishing,
maintaining and developing of the information system, and (f) promote ASC.

TAiwan Confidential Aviation Safety REporting
In June 1999, the feasibility study of the reporting system in Taiwan was
conducted by Nation Cheng Kung University. Based on the recommendations of the
study, a system with the concept of voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive that •
provides a channel to collect aviation safety information was launched in the same year
by the flight safety division in ASC. Safety information gained through reports will be
published via TACARE Newsletters. Since the system was established, 17
recommendations concluded from significant reports have been provided to the CAA for
further improvement (TACARE, n.d.)
In TACARE's introduction (n.d.), it states:
To encourage the reporting of actual or potential threats involving the safety of
aviation operations, TACARE invites flight crew, maintenance personnel, air
traffic controllers, flight attendants, or any other person to report to the system.
TACARE provides an independent reporting channel for all personnel in the
aviation community based on the concept of being "confidential, voluntary and
non-punitive. Under such ideology, TACARE hopes to elevate Taiwan's aviation
safety by obtaining, distributing and analyzing safety-related reports, and keeping
the identity of the reporter confidential at all times. (1)2)
TACARE has provided five channels for users to submit a report: phone, fax,
email, website, and traditional mail. The users can report any concern, event, and unsafe
conditions to TACARE, unless that information would be related to accidents, serious
incidents (aviation occurrence), and criminal offenses, which should be filed directly to
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the ASC, the CAA, and the law enforcement agency. Upon receiving reports, the
TACARE working group would follow the processes shown in Figure 10. The
de-identification process would be conducted within 72 hours after the contents of the
report have been confirmed. Thereby, the confidentiality and anonymity of the reporters
and the parties involved can be ensured (TACARE, n.d.).
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Figure 10. The Processes of TACARE (Adapted from TACARE. n.d.).
Once the report has been received and de-identified, the analysts would start
categorizing and analyzing the information. If the reported information can be considered
significant enough to improve flight safety, it would be forwarded to the CAA and
operators in a de-identified form. The information would also be provided to the public
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through the Newsletters (similar to CALLBACK in NASA ASRS) and the TACARE
website (TACARE, n.d.).
Each working group member has signed the Non-disclosure Agreement
(TACARE, n.d.). Nevertheless, the Non-disclosure Agreement has not been stated in the
Taiwanese Aviation Regulation; thus, the level of TACARE's confidentiality has been
questioned. Although there has been no breach of confidentiality and punishment against
the reporter since TACARE has been established, the ASC has determined that
TACARE's immunity policy has been an issue of system operations. Even though the
ASC has dedicated itself to improving the effectiveness of the TACARE, to date, there
are only three incident reports from ground services personnel and no reports from
maintenance personnel. Compared to ASRS and ASAP in the U.S., the TACARE system
is insufficient to reduce the maintenance errors and improve aircraft safety.

Research Questions
The review of the literature associated with the TACARE problem resulted in
three research questions:
1. "What is the understanding of safety for maintenance personnel in Taiwan"?
2. "How would the Taiwanese maintenance personnel accept the concept of
voluntary safety reporting program"?
3. "How does a U.S. voluntary safety program for aircraft maintenance operations
implement into Asian culture"?
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Chapter III
METHODOLOGY
Very little research has been conducted to study the safety of aircraft maintenance
in Taiwan recently. Since the perspectives of maintenance personnel toward TACARE
were unknown previously, this research used a mixed method design to obtain that data.
The data collection instruments were developed by the researcher and targeted both
qualitative and quantitative research methods. This design provided quantifiable results
and added validity to the research questions.
A questionnaire and a set of interview topics were designed and administrated to
evaluate the effectiveness and acceptance of voluntary incident reporting programs for
maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Safety and voluntary reporting are sensitive issues,
thus all the personal information from interviewees and survey takers were de-identified.
The interviews and surveys remained confidential, and none of the participants' personal
information was revealed in public.

Mixed Method
The mixed method research designs combined both quantitative and qualitative
approaches by mixing the data from both of their data in a single study (Gay, Mills, &
Airasian, 2006). By interpreting the data from quantitative and qualitative research
methods, researchers are able to have a broader view of the research and then verify the
outcomes. The utilization of mixed methods has increased in recent years, but the method
is still considered new in research design. Since mixed methods produce high validity of
the collected data, there are more applications in different research fields, especially in
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aviation, which requires highly accurate results.
There are a number of different strategies for mixed methods. Creswell (2003)
classifies them in six main categories: (a) sequential explanatory strategy, (b) sequential
exploratory strategy, (c) sequential transformative strategy, (d) concurrent triangulation
strategy, (e) concurrent nested strategy, and (f) concurrent transformative strategy.
Because of the nature of unknown outcomes in this research, the instruments in this study
utilized a sequential explanatory strategy. Quantitative data were collected and analyzed
first. Based on the results of quantitative data, the qualitative method was conducted to
gather more detailed information. This strategy gathered information from perspectives at
different levels.
A sequential explanatory model is identified by its use of one data collecting
process. It is considered the most straightforward among those mixed method approaches.
As Figure 11 shows, the procedures of qualitative and quantitative designs are working
sequentially. It is characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data
followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The two methods are
integrated during the interpretation phase of the study.
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The purpose of the sequential explanatory strategy typically is to use qualitative
results to assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of primarily quantitative
research. It can be especially helpful when unexpected results arise from quantitative data.
The qualitative data can be used to examine these surprising results in more detail. The
strategy is also easy to implement because the steps fall into clear and separated stages.
The design feature makes it easy to describe and report (Creswell, 2003). Based on the
strengths of the sequential explanatory strategy, this study starts with quantitative
research through general surveys and follows with qualitative research through individual
interviews.

The Survey
The quantitative research with surveys was performed through a random sampling
from the entire population of Taiwanese maintenance personnel from (a) maintenance
and engineering departments in the airlines; (b) Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
(MRO) facilities; and (c) ground services companies. The 4-page survey consisted of a
cover letter and 24 questions, 15 multiple choice, and 9 Likert-type-scale questions. The
cover letter included (a) a basic introduction about the research, (b) the terms and
conditions of this research, and (c) the contact information of the researcher. The English
version of the survey is shown in Appendix A.
The first section of the survey instrument (Questions 1-2) included inquiries
related to the knowledge of voluntary safety reporting programs and the term - Just
Culture. Question 1 was designed to examine maintainers' familiarity and utilization of
the voluntary safety programs in the U.S. and worldwide. Question 2 and 2A were
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designed to study whether the maintainers in Taiwan have knowledge of Just Culture.
The second section of the survey (Questions 3-6) were comprised of inquiries
about the TACARE system. Question 3 was designed to examine maintainers' familiarity
with TACARE. Questions 4 and 5 were designed to study the utilization of TACARE on
the part of mechanics and their reasons why they would choose not to utilize TACARE.
Question 6 was designed to measure the maintainers' beliefs regarding the responsibility
of TACARE.
The third section of the survey instrument (Questions 6 through 14) were
comprised of 9 statements, upon which participants could express their opinions by
choosing the appropriate answers from the 4-point Likert-type-scale. These questions
were designed to examine the maintainers' acceptance of those concepts underlying
voluntary safety reporting programs. The responses to these questions were subsequently
utilized to evaluate the factors that influence the effectiveness of the TACARE program.
The most important characteristic of this section was the 4- point Likert-type-scale. The
Likert scale is generally developed as a 5-point scale and has been popular in many
research studies. Because of the tendency to not choose sides in Chinese culture, the
neutral choice may compromise this study. As a result, the 4-point Likert-type-scale was
deemed more desirable in that it eliminated the neutral choice and forced either an
agreement or a disagreement with the statement.
The last section of the survey (Questions 16-24) had 10 demographic Questions.
Questions 16 to 19 included gender, nationality, age, and experience. Questions 20 and
21 were about the respondents' primary training source and certificates. Questions 22 and
23 determined the position of the individual maintainer in the organization. Question 24
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was an inquiry about whether the participant is willing to receive an electronic copy of
the result. The background of the participants played an important role in exploring the
possibility of their acceptance of the TACARE system. These 10 Questions were utilized
to discover the different influences in the population. The survey was designed to be
completed in 10 minutes, with a blank space provided for participants to add comments.

The Interview
The qualitative research with interviews was conducted after the initial analysis of
those returned surveys. The interviews were designed to be a case study of one
maintenance organization in Taiwan. They were conducted to obtain more in-depth
information from the selected participants building upon the survey questions. A list of
semi-structured questionnaires was established as a basic outline for interviews. Other
participants' comments besides the questions were also included. Since the participants
were all based in Taiwan, the interviews were performed verbally via international phone
calls and the internet communication software - Skype. Interviewees included certified
mechanics, experienced supervisors, and managers in the MRO facility in Taiwan. The
interviewees were selected from convenience samples. All of the personal information
remained confidential in this research.
A brief set of semi-structured interview questions was intended to produce
qualitative responses from them. All questions were framed in the open-ended format to
obtain the greatest amount of information. Questions 1 and 2 were designed to gather
information related to the incentives and other factors that contributed to the participants'
willingness or ultimate decision to utilize the TACARE system. Question 1 inquired
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about interviewees' knowledge of the TACARE system. Question 2 inquired into the
participants' opinions regarding the influences of the TACARE system and the safety
culture among maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Questions 3 and 4 were designed to
gather information concerning the benefits that the company had gained from the
company's internal voluntary safety reporting program and the SMS. Question 5 was
designed to obtain participants' opinions of challenges, advantages, and disadvantages
related to having a voluntary reporting program. Questions 6 to 8 were utilized to
examine the existence of Just Culture and to discover what best practices could be
employed to improve the level of Just Culture and voluntary safety reporting programs.
Finally, Question 9 was designed to solicit any relevant comment about aircraft
maintenance safety in Taiwan.
The 4-page interview instrument included (a) a cover letter with brief
introduction, (b) interview topics, and (c) demographic inquiries. The instrument was
designed to optimize each participant's response on all topics. A blank space was
provided after each question to allow the interviewees and interviewer sufficient area for
written comments. The interview was designed to be completed within 15 minutes, while
still giving participants enough time to answer all questions. All interviewees were
advised by e-mail in advance that all participants would be anonymous, and all responses
would be de-identified. The English version of the interview instrument was included in
Appendix C.
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Instruments Review
Designs of the English version of the interview and survey instruments were
completed in January, 2010. Upon completion, the instruments were reviewed and
approved by the thesis's advisor - Dr. Donald S. Metscher and readers - Dr. James D.
Ramsay, and Captain Roger A. Mason. Although the interview questions and the survey
were originally developed in English, it required translation into Chinese for the intended
participants, as most of them were native Taiwanese.
The instruments were translated into Chinese not only word-by- word, but also
using aviation terminology to fit their working vocabulary. The problem of translating the
English instruments into Chinese was that some aviation terms could not be translated
into Chinese words directly. Some of the professional terms, such as Just Culture, had no
single agreed-upon word to express it in Chinese. Therefore, the researcher decided to
follow the translation of those aviation safety terms, which are used in the publications of
ASC in Taiwan.
The Chinese versions of the instruments were completed right after the
completion of the English versions and then reviewed by Mr. Luke Lu - Chief Executive
Officer of Formosa Aerospace Corporation, Mr. Chia-Ning Chen - the researcher's father
and Aviation Journalist of United Daily News, and Mr. Michael Chen - former Master of
Science in Aeronautics student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Project
Manager in C-Media Electronics, Inc. This procedure was to ensure that participants
understood the questions clearly and allowed for more accurate answers to the research
questions. It also ensured the highest possible return rate and completeness of response.
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Both the English and Chinese versions were ultimately revised in February 3, 2010. The
Chinese versions of the survey and interview are included in Appendix B and D.

Administration of the Instrument
Unlike the U.S., Taiwanese mechanics, supervisors, and managers in aircraft
maintenance business had been reluctant to voluntarily participate in interview or survey
studies. Therefore, the researcher expected to encounter significant challenges during the
actual administration of the instrument. The method to administer the research
instruments was recommended by Mr. Cha-Ning Chen (researcher's father). Since he had
deep connections with Taiwanese airline business, his contacts in the Public Relations
(PR) department of each company were employed to initiate the communication. After
that, the researcher was able to make contacts with most of the major companies in
Taiwanese commercial aviation industry. Those companies included (a) China Airlines,
(b) Taoyuan International Airport Services Co. Ltd. (T1AS), (c) Evergreen Group Evergreen Aviation Technologies Corp. (EGAT) and Evergreen Airline Services Corp.
(EGAS), and (d) TransAsia Airways. Through e-mail communications with the public
relations departments in those companies, the researcher was able tofinalizethe content
of the instruments and the distribution method.
After the final revision of the survey, it was sent to Mr. Chia-Ning Chen through
e-mail. Depending on each company's preference, the survey was prepared in both paper
copies and electronic forms. Following the instructions of each company, the survey
forms were distributed on February 5, 2010.
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The interview was designed to gather descriptive data, which could not be fully
obtained by the surveys. The interview was designed to be conducted after the returns of
the surveys as a case study of one company. The researcher had decided to perform the
interviews with participants from EGAT. The interviewees were selected by the
company's convenience and each individual employee's willingness to contribute further
in this research, and then the interview questions were emailed to each individual
interviewee in advance.

Distribution of the Instrument
Both language versions of the survey in electronic files were provided to the
contact person of each company. After their assessments, only the Chinese version of the
survey was needed. With the approval from the contact person in each company, the
survey forms were distributed to the associated departments in those companies by Mr.
Chia-Ning Chen on February 5, 2010.
A total number of 630 forms were distributed. With the help from Ms. Katherine
Ko - Manager of PR in Evergreen Group, there were 266 paper forms for both EGAT
and EGAS. As for China Airlines, with the help of Ms. Amy Sun - Manager of PR and
Mr. Jerry Wang - Manager of Quality Assurance (QA), there were 200 paper forms and
another 14 electronic forms distributed in the company's maintenance and engineering
department. In addition, through personal contacts, there were 100 paper forms for
TransAsia Airways and 50 for TIAS. The period of the surveys' distribution and
returning was designed to end on March 5, 2010.
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Based on the information from the initial analysis of those returned surveys, a
final revision on the semi-structured interview questions was made to adjust the
measurement toward the understandings of participants. The interview period with the
participants was started on March 15, 2010, and each interviewee was contacted via
e-mail by the researcher. There were 9 interviewees in this case study from EGAT. Due
to the difficulties in communication (e.g., differences in time zone and interviewee's duty
hours), each interviewee was able to choose to answer the questions in written form via
e-mail or schedule a convenient time with researcher for telephone interview.

Treatment of Data
The data for this thesis were collected to evaluate the safety culture of aircraft
maintenance in Taiwan, and there were information from interviews and surveys. The
demographic data both from interviews and surveys were classified to understand
differences between groups. The answers from interviews were categorized to determine
the outcomes. The data from the surveys were analyzed and charted using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and measured using non parametric inferential
statistical methods. The quantitative data in the surveys were treated as ordinal data for
test of significance and correlation. Finally, there was a comparison of outcomes from
interviews and surveys to assess the final results of this thesis.
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Chapter IV
RESULTS
In this research, there are both quantitative and qualitative data. The distribution
of the survey (Appendixes A and B) was from February 5 to March 5, 2010. A total of
630 surveys were administered, and 605 surveys were returned for a participation rate of
96.03%. Conversely, the interview (Appendixes C and D) was conducted from March 29
to April 9, 2010, and there were nine interviewees. The results from both are presented
and discussed in the following section.

Survey
The participants of this study were from the aircraft maintenance personnel in
airlines, MRO facilities, and ground service companies in Taiwan. The participants were
classified by their airlines or other affiliation with which participants were employed and
according to their job specifications in the airlines. The participants' companies were (a)
China Airlines, (b) Taoyuan International Airport Services Co. Ltd. (TIAS), (c)
Evergreen Group - Evergreen Aviation Technologies Corp. (EGAT) and Evergreen
Airline Services Corp. (EGAS), and (d) TransAsia Airways. Figure 12 showed that the
Evergreen Group (EVA) dominated the majority of participants (43.97%). China Airlines
included 32.40% of the participants. TransAsia Airways and TIAS comprised 16.03%
and 7.6% of total participants, respectively.
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Multiple Choice Questions
The purposes of survey questions 1 through 6 were to obtain participants' attitude
and knowledge regarding voluntary safety programs. These questions had multiple choice
answers; thus, the choices of answers were required to be coded for statistical analysis.
The data were coded as follows: (a) 1 = Option "a", (b) 2 = Option "b", (c) 3 = Option
*'c". and (d) 4 = Option "d", and continuing in this manner.
Question 1 was designed to determine the participants' knowledge of the
voluntary safety programs in the U.S. and worldwide. The participants were able to
choose any program(s) by simply knowing of the particular program or general
knowledge of the programs. The results in Table 1 show that 55.5% of participants had
heard of SMS. Following that, 46.4% of participants had known about ASRS and
International Air Transportation Association Operational Safety Audit (10SA). Flight
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Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) was known by 27.1% of participants. ASAP,
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), Line Operational Safety Audit (LOSA),
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP), and Internal Evaluation Program (IEP)
collectively were known by less than 15% of participants.

Table 1
Familiarization with Voluntary Safety Programs.
ASRS

ASAP

FOQA

AQP

LOSA

VDRP

IEP

SMS

lOSA

Cases

281

90

164

32

69

68

52

336

281

Percent

46.4

14.9

27.1

5.3

11.4

11.2

8.6

55.5

46.4

Question 2 involved the familiarization of the Just Culture (Table 2). There were
four participants who did not answer this question. A total of 601 participants' responses
were valid, and only 18.3% had heard about the term Just Culture.

Table 2
Just Culture Familiarization.
Frequency

Percent

Yes

no

ill

No

491

81.7

Total

601

100.0

Missing

4

Question 2-A presented the level of understanding about the concepts of Just
Culture. The results are shown in Table 3. Among 110 participants who had heard about
Just Culture, 80 respondents believed they understood the concepts of Just Culture.
Therefore, only 13.2% of the total participants were educated concerning Just Culture.
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Table 3
Understanding of Just Culture.
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Yes

80

13.2

72.7

No

30

5.0

27.3

Total Respondent

110

18.2

100.0

Total Participant

605

100.0

There were 601 participants out of 605 who answered Question 3. The results in
Table 4 show that 61.7% of respondents were familiar with TACARE, but they had'never
utilized it before. Only 3.6% of participants (n = 22) who had known of it and utilized it
before. There were 33.8% of participants who were not aware of the existence of
TACARE and another 4.5% of participants (n=27) showed no interests in TACARE.

Table 4
TACARE Familiarization.
Frequency

Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

22

3.6

3.7

3.7

Yes, but I have not used it

349

57.7

58.1

61.7

No, 1 am not aware of TACARE

203

33.6

33.8

95.5

27

4.5

4.5

100.0

601

99.3

100.0

4

.7

605

100.0

Yes, and I have used it

No, it is no importance to me
Total Respondent
Missing
Total Participants

As illustrated in Table 5, the results of Question 4 show the willingness of
reporting in Taiwan. More than 90% of participants suggested that it is important to
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submit reports to the TACARE system and only 9.1% of participants said they would not
submit reports to TACARE.

Table 5
TACARE Participation.
Frequency

Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

Yes

545

90l

908

90.8

No

55

9.1

9.2

100.0

Total Respondents
Missing

600
5

99.2
.8

100.0

Total Participants

605

100.0

Question 5 consisted of two parts: 5-A and 5-B. Question 5-A examined
participants' belief in the responsibility of reporting (Table 6). Among participants
believing in the importance of TACARE, 73.9% of them believed that it is everyone's
responsibility to file a report when a safety problem was spotted. Fewer respondents
(9.6% and 10.1%) indicated that a safety problem can only be reported by supervisor or
inspector.

Table 6
TACARE Reporters (Question 5-A).
Frequency

Percent

Supervisor

54

9.6

Mechanic/Operator

36

6.4

Inspector

57

10.1

Anyone

416

73.9
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Question 5-B inquired into the possible factors that caused participants not to
submit a safety report to TACARE. There were five statements and one open-ended
option for participants to choose. The statements were listed as: (a) the probability of
disciplinary action(s) from my company, (b) the lack of confidence on the immunity of TACARE
system, (c) my unfamiliarity with the TACARE reporting procedures, (d) I do not believe a
submission of a TACARE report would not improve flight safety, and (e) the company has its
own reporting procedure, so TACARE is irrelevant. The participants were allowed to choose
multiple answers related to their concerns with reporting to TACARE. Figure 13 shows
the number of respondents for each statement. Statement "c" had the highest count of 143
respondents, which suggested the lack of knowledge on the reporting procedures.
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Figure 13. Reasons for not Participating in TACARE (Question 5-B)
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There were 12 participants who selected the open-ended option and 11 of them
wrote down their opinions. Table 7 illustrated the statements from those participants.

Table 7
Other Reasons for not Participating in TACARE.
Frequency
Not applicable
1 did not see any change from TACARE.
There are high standards for Quality Control (QC) and inspection in the
company.
ASC did not provide just investigation; thus, I do not have confidence on ASC.
1 did not notice any safety issue.
I was not aware of TACARE's existence.
There is not enough protection on the information.
I did not perform maintenance on aircraft directly.
Nothing needs to be reported so far.
The system should mandate all aviation personnel to report.
When the company's reporting system fail or is unable to remove the hazard,
TACARE will be used.
Total

12

Question 6 inquired into participants' perspectives about which agencies should
be held accountable for the administration of TACARE. Different parties listed in Table 8
were presented to the participants, and multiple answers were allowed for participants.
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The results show that 45.8% of participants believed that CAA should collect the data
and process them. The ASC was selected by 41.7% of participants. An independent
organization and each company itself were selected by 31.4% and 26.8% of participants.

Table 8
TACARE Accountable Parties
CAA

Organization

Cases

277

190

252

162

Percent

45.8

31.4

41.7

26.8

ASC

Company

Likert-Type-Scale Questionnaires
The second part of the survey was comprised of 4-point Likert-type-scale
questions. The main purpose of those agreement questions was to evaluate participants'
acceptance of the principles related to voluntary safety programs. In accordance with
normal coding practice, they were coded as: (a) Strongly Agree = 1, (b) Agree = 2, (c)
Disagree = 3, (d) Strongly Disagree = 4.
In Table 9, the results of Question 7 show that 47.2% of the respondents strongly
agreed that a well-organized voluntary and confidential incident reporting system would
enhance aviation safety. Another 49.3% were in moderate agreement with this statement.
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Table 9
Voluntary Reporting System Related to Aviation Safety.
Frequency
Strongly Agree

283

47.2

Cumulative
Percent
47.2

Agree

296

49.3

96.5

17

2.8

99.3

Strongly Disagree

4

.7

100.0

Total Respondents

600

100.0

Disagree

Percent

The results of Question 8 are shown in Table 10. Over 50% of respondents
strongly agreed that the information in incident reports should be de-identified and
remain anonymous for the public. There was a total of 93.5% of respondents who agreed
this statement.

Table 10
Agreement on Personal Information Protection.
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree

305

50.8

50.8

Agree

256

42.7

93.5

Disagree

28

4.7

98.2

Strongly Disagree

11

1.8

100.0
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Question 9 discussed the acceptance of team review in the voluntary reporting
program. The results (Table 11) show that 97.3% of participants consented to the concept
that incident reports should be reviewed by a team of safety experts and investigators.

Table 11
Agreement Regarding Team Review.
Frequency
Strongly Agree

262

43.8

Cumulative
Percent
43.8

Agree

321

53.5

97.3

12

2.0

99.3

.7

100.0

Disagree

Percent

Strongly Disagree
Total Respondents

600

100.0

In Table 12, the results of Question 10 revealed a slightly less agreement than the
average agreement on those questions. The data indicated that the concept of including an
employee representative in the report review team was supported by 83.8% of
participants.

Table 12
Participation of Employee Representative.
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree

196

32.7

32.7

Agree

306

51.1

83.8

Disagree

71

11.9

95.7

Strongly Disagree

26

4.3

100.0

Total Respondents

599

100.0

Question 11 asked the degree of agreement that Just Culture should be introduced
to safety experts and representatives in team review of the voluntary reporting program.
The results in Table 13 showed that it was agreed to by 93.1% of participants.

Table 13
Acceptance of Just Culture.
Frequency

Percent

Strongly Agree

168

28.3

Cumulative
Percent
28.3

Agree

385

64.8

93.1

Disagree

26

4.4

97.5

Strongly Disagree

15

2.5

100.0
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Question 12 asked about whether acceptable behaviors (human errors and at-risk
behaviors) should be protected from disciplinary actions in a Just Culture. Table 14
shows 88.4% of participants concurred in this concept of Just Culture.

Table 14
Protection for Acceptable Behaviors.
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree

214

36.1

36.1

Agree

310

52.3

88.4

Disagree

57

9.6

98.0

Strongly Disagree

12

2.0

100.0

Total Respondents

593

100.0

Question 13 asked about whether unacceptable behaviors (reckless behaviors)
should not be protected in the voluntary reporting program. Table 15 shows 86.9% of
participants agreed in this concept of Just Culture.
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Table 15
No Immunity for Unacceptable Behaviors.
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree

184

31.2

31.2

Agree

329

55.8

86.9

Disagree

50

8.5

95.4

Strongly Disagree

27

4.6

100.0

Total Respondents

590

100.0

The results of Question 14 shown in Table 16 discovered a slightly lesser
agreement when compared to average agreement among those questions. There were
83.6% of participants who agreed and strongly agreed that in their opinion unanimous
consensus must be reached by all members of the incident review team on events
reported.

Table 16
Agreement on Reaching Unanimous Consensus.
Frequency

Percent

Strongly Agree

150

25.3

Cumulative
Percent
25.3

Agree

345

58.3

83.6

Disagree

83

14.0

97.6

Strongly Disagree

14

2.4

100.0
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The results of Question 15 show that a great deal of participants (97.3%) agreed
that the voluntary reporting program should create effective feedbacks to the reporting
community. The data results are shown in Table 17.

Table 17
Effective Feedbacks from Incident Reports.
Frequency

Percent

Strongly Agree

258

43.3

Cumulative
Percent
43.3

Agree

322

54.0

97.3

10

1.7

99.0

6

1.0

100.0

596

100.0

Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total Respondents

The overall agreement of each participant regarding the concepts of the voluntary
reporting program was summarized with each individual's agreement level from
Question 7 to 15. With 9 Likert-type-scale questions, the maximum agreement total sum
for each participant was (a) Strongly Agree = 1 x 9 = 9, (b) Agree = 2 x 9 = 18, (c)
Disagree = 3 x 9 = 27, and (d) Strongly Disagree = 4 x 9 =36. The lowest possible
agreement total sum with strongly agree was 9; the highest possible agreement total sum
was 36. There were 582 valid cases for calculation. The mean (M) was 15.56, which
showed the positive trend of agreement on those concepts. The confidence interval was
set as 95%. The total sums of agreement level are graphed in Figure 19.
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Figure 14. Total Sums of Agreement Level with Likert-type-scale Questions

Demographics
Questions 16 through 24 in the survey were demographic questions. The data
from Question 16 (Table 18) found that the majority (94.7%) of maintenance personnel in
Taiwan were male. There were only 32 female participants (5.3%).
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Table 18
Gender of Participants.
Frequency
Male
Female
Total Respondents
Missing
Total Participants

Percent

567

93.7

Valid
Percent
94.7

32

5.3

5.3

599

99.0

100.0

6

1.0

605

100.0

The results from Question 17 (Table 19) show that the majority of participants
(96.7%) were Taiwanese. There were only 3 participants (0.5%) who also had foreign
citizenship. However, 20 participants (3.3%) did not answer this question.

Table 19
Nationality of Participants.
Cases
Percent

Taiwanese
585
96.7

Foreigner
3
0.5

Missing
20
3.3

Question 18 asked the age group of each participant (Figure 15). Among the 600
respondents, most of them (46%) were in the age group from 31 to 40. The second
highest number of participants (25.83%) was the group from age 41 to 50. The youngest
age group from 18 to 30 had 16.83% of participants. There were 9.83% of participants in
the age group from 51 to 60, and there were only 1.5% of participants had an age over 61.
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Age

• 18-30
• 31 -40
• 41 -50

• 51-60
• Over 61

Figure 15 Participants' Age Groups
There were 29 participants that chose not to respond to Question 19. Figure 16
shows the level of experience for each respondent. The majority of respondents (45.7%)
had been working in aviation industry from 11 to 20 years. There were 38.4% of
respondents had less than 10 years of experience in aviation and another 16% had
experience over 20 years.
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Aviation
Experience
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DOuer 20 Years

Figure 16. Groups of Aviation Experience
Question 20 represented the training sources of participants (Figure 17). Most of
the participants (n=481) received training from their companies. The second highest
source for training was the Taiwanese air force (n=S 73). Also, 142 participants received
aviation related college degrees. However, there were only 69 participants who had
training from an aircraft maintenance training school. Other sources of training included
training from (a) manufacturer, (b) other airlines, (c) computer simulation, and (d) the
government, where there were 12 participants.
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Figure 17. Sources of Aircraft Maintenance Training
In Figure 18, the results of Question 21 show that half of the participants (n-305)
hold the CAA aircraft maintenance certificate. Among the participants, only 79 of them
hold the ¥ AA Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) certificate. There was one participant who
held an Aircraft Parts Repair Certificate, and one with a Pratt and Whitnev Powerplant
certificate. On the other hand, there were 273 participants who did not hold am
maintenance certificate.
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Figure 18. Maintenance Certificate Holding
Question 22 discussed the different professional fields of participants. The fields
are listed in Table 20. The majority of participants (87.4%) were mechanics in the fields
of (a) line maintenance, (b) hangar maintenance, (c) shop maintenance, and (d) ground
services and ramp operations. There were 22.6% of participants in other functions of a
maintenance organization.

Table 20
Participants' Professional Fields.
Frequency
Line Maintenance
Line and Hangar
Line, Hangar, and Shop
Line, Hangar, Shop, and Ramp
Line, Hangar, and Ramp
Line and Shop
Line and Ramp

104
13
8
12
5
4
7

17.2
2.1
1.3
2.0
.8
.7
1.2

Cumulative
Percent
17.2
19.3
20.7
22.6
23.5
24.1
25.3

Hangar Maintenance
Hangar and Shop
Hangar and Ramp

179
9
1

29.6
1.5
.2

54.9
56.4
56.5

Shop Maintenance
Shop and Ramp

125
1

20.7
.2

77.2
77.4

Ramp Operations

61

10.1

87.4

Other
Administration
Dispatch
Documentation
Engineering
Human Resource
Information Technology
Management
Material Support
Production Planning and Control
Purchasing
Quality Assurance
Safety
Security
Training

4
1
1
9
2
1
3
12
5
2
11
3
1
1

.7
.2
.2
1.5
.3
.2
.5
2.0
.8
.3
1.8
.5
.2
.2

88.1
88.3
88.4
89.9
90.2
90.4
90.9
92.9
93.7
94.0
95.9
96.4
96.5
96.7

20
605

3.3
100.0

100.0

Not Classified
Total

Percent

79
Question 23 shows the titles of participants, and the results are listed in Table 21.
Mechanics and operators had the most participation (59.3%). There were 12.6% of
participants who were managers and 13.4% of them who were supervisors. Other
participants included (a) engineers (4.8%), (b) staff (2.5%), (c) inspectors (1.5%), and (d)
others.
Table 21
Titles of Participants.
Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Manager

76

12.6

12.6

Supervisor

81

13.4

26.0

359

59.3

85.3

Mechanic or Operator
Auditor

5

.8

86.1

President

1

.2

86.3

Confidential

1

.2

86.4

Contractor

1

.2

86.6

Controller

2

.3

86.9

Engineer

29

4.8

91.7

Inspector

9

1.5

93.2

Maintenance Planner

1

.2

93.4

Researcher

2

.3

93.7

15

2.5

96.2

Vice President

1

.2

96.4

Not Classified

22

3.6

100.0

605

100.0

Staff

Total

80

Question 24 examined participants' willingness to receive the outcomes of this
research. Only 90 participants (14.9%) presented their interests to be further informed
about the results. The data are shown in Table 22.
Table 22
Willingness to Receive the Results.
Yes
No
Not Classified
Total

Frequency
90
501
14
605

Percent
14.9
82.8
2.3
100.0

Comparison
The samples in this survey study were categorized into different groups by
participants' demographics, such as age, experience training source, and certificate
holding. To determine whether the results have significant differences between groups,
the researcher utilized SPSS and conducted a series of comparisons.
Overall, there was only one significant difference regarding Question 2. The
results of the comparison between the knowledge of Just Culture and aviation experience
are shown in Figure 20. The three pie charts represent the differences of three experience
levels. With the higher experience level, there was a tendency to have more participants
who know about Just Culture. The number went from 12.33% in the group of 0 -10 years
experience to 33.70% in the group of over 21 years experience. There was no other
significant difference between demographic groups on other questions.
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Figure 20. Differences between Experience Levels and the Knowledge of Just Culture

Interview
The strategy for the mixed research method in this research was the sequential
explanatory strategy. This method collected and analyzed quantitative data (survey) in the
first phase of research followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data in the
second phase. The qualitative data in this study played a supporting role to the primary
quantitative data.
During the process of the interview, the qualitative data were recorded and
categorized. Due to the fact that all of the participants preferred to be interviewed in
Chinese, the data needed to be translated into English before analysis. There were three
interviewees who requested to answer the interview questions via telephone calls. Due to
the difficulties of interview timing, the other six interviewees chose to answer the
interview questions via e-mail. The following sections contained descriptions about the
results of those interviews.
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Open-ended Questions
The open-ended questions were designed to examine (a) the factors influencing
TACARE's effectiveness, (b) the issues of voluntary reporting in a maintenance
organization, and (c) possible solutions to improve the utilization of TACARE. There
were nine open-ended questions. The answers to Questions 1 to 9 are presented in the
following sections. The numbers of respondents for each question are included. The
frequencies of those common answers of each question are also listed.
Question 1 illustrated the understandings of TACARE principles. All nine •
interviewees answered this question, and the results are listed in Table 23. There were
three interviewees who do not know the principles of TACARE. Other interviewees had
knowledge about TACARE, but only partially.

Table 23
Understandings of TACARE principles.
Answers

Frequency

1. Voluntary

3

2. Submit safety recommendations

1

3. Provide confidentiality and immunity for participants

2

4. Identify safety hazards to prevent accident

3

5. Is developed by ASC to share safety information

2

6. There are TACARE newsletters on the company's bullitin
board.

1

7. Only heard the term - TACARE

1

8. None

2
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Question 2 examined the issues that impact the effectiveness of TACARE. The
results (Table 24) show that there was (a) no action from TACARE, (b) only little
information about it, and (c) difficulty to utilize the reporting procedure. Therefore,
TACARE was not commonly used.

Table 24
Effectiveness of TACARE.
Answers

Frequency

1. Insufficient Information and feedback to the stakeholders

2

2. Not enough promotion to air carriers

1

3. No actual corrective or preventive actions from TACARE

2

4. VDRP is commonly utilized

1

5. Could be easier to submit report with multiple choice
questionnaire and web-based system

1

6. Only knows by researchers and people who go through ASC
training courses

1

Total Respondents

7

Question 3 discussed the benefits of the existing reporting system in the
organization. Even though it is not a voluntary program, the interviewees believed there
were safety improvements from their in-house reporting system. The benefits were listed
in Table 25. Only one interviewee suggested that there was no change from those reports.
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Table 25
Benefits from In-house Reporting System.
Answers

Frequency

1. Improve controls on equipment and personnel

1

2. Additions and replacement on safety equipment

1

3. More emphasize on the inspection of working environment
safety

1

4. Positive attitude toward safety

2

5. Reward and punishment

1

6. High standards from the management

. 2

7. Strictly follow CAA's regulation and company's Standard
Operation Procedures (SOPs) as part of the company culture

2

8. Corrective or preventive actions are taken rapidly after
reporting

1

9. Case study in annual recurrent MRM training
10. Safety notices in job task cards
11. Quick emergency responses
12. Each department has its own safety reporting beside the
company one
13. Modified procedures
14. Safety record keeping
15. The establishment of independent safety and health
department
16. There is no signifiacnt change since the safety of aircraft
maintenance is managed by the company
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Question 4 demonstrated the benefits of implementing SMS. The results (Table
26) suggested that the company has had a positive safety culture. With the
implementation of SMS, safety was being enhanced even more. There were positive
attitudes among employees and systematic approaches to improve safety.
Table 26
BenefitsfromSMS.
Answers
1. Significantly reduce the incident rate

Frequency
#

2

2. Safety Policy

2

3. Employees are not hiding any incident

3

4. Positive attitude toward reporting in a timely manner

1

5. Surveillance and Inspection Reporting

2

6. Statistics Analysis and records

2

7. The utilization of SRM in every aspect of the company
8. The raise of safety awareness among employees
9. SMS Training
10. Regularly safety meetings
11. No matter there is SMS or not, safety cultre is there in the
company
Total Respondents

9

The results of Question 5 (Table 27) showed the different aspects of promoting
TACARE. They consisted of three parts: (a) challenges, (b) advantages, and (c) concerns.
The issue of trust between authority and reporter remained a major challenge. However,
there were strengths in positive company culture and audits from foreign customers.
Finally, the willingness of sharing information was a great concern.
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Table 27
Different Aspects of Promoting TACARE.
Answers
Challenges
1. The trustworthy of confidentiality
2. Social Culture, PD
3. The conflicts between TACARE, company's QA system, and
CAA's oversight
4. The consequence against the company after reporting a
problem
5. Continuous improvement
6. The company already has in-house reporting system. There is
no point to submit report to TACARE

Frequency
1
2
1
1
1
1
"

Advantages
1. The passion among maintenance personnel
2. Foreign Customers with audits
3. The benefit of identifying hazards
4. Progressive company culture toward safety issues

1
2
1
1

Concerns
1. A rapid and effective way to relay safety information
2. Passive and conservative attitudes
3. TACARE is unknown by the industry
4. The willingness to share personal experience
5. The company posseses the authority of safety, and TACARE
can not get involved.

1
2
2
1
1

Total Respondents

8

Question 6 shows interviewees' knowledge about Just Culture. The answers from
interviewees (Table 28) consistently showed that they had no knowledge about Just
Culture.
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Table 28
Knowledge about Just Culture.
Answers

Frequency

1. None

8

Total Respondents

8

Question 7 examined interviewee's understandings on the company's safety
policy. Most of the interviewees were aware of the safety policy in place, but there were
two interviewees who had no knowledge or were unclear of a company safety policy. The
responses (Table 29) revealed that the company's safety policy did not provide
confidentiality and immunity to the reporter (n=l). The reports went through open
investigation and shared with the public (n=3). The company's reporting program had a
group of subject matter experts to review incident reports (n=3). Then, the company took
disciplinary actions to unacceptable behaviors and rewarded the good ones (n=2).

Table 29
Understandings of Company's Safety Policy.
Answers
1. Yes, 80 percent confidence
2. No
3. Unclear about the policy
4. Policy is in the SMS manual, and employees are all
acknowledged
5. Committee Review
6. Just and open to public investigation
7. Public information sharing
8. Standards for acceptable and unacceptable with reward and
punishment
9. The company has full authority on the issues of safety policy,
such as confidentiality and imunity
Total Respondents

Frequency
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
2
1
8
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Question 8 was designed to understand possible means to improve the safety
culture in the organization. Table 30 shows interviewees' belief on the ways to promote
safety through different forms of training and communication.
Table 30
Methods of Improving Safety Culture.
Answers

Frequency

1. Education on Just Culture

1

2. SMS training courses

1

3. Recurrent training with case studies

3

4. Field experience sharing

1

5. Active and direct communication and information sharing
between CAA, ASC, and MRO

2

6. Web based Training

2

7. Continuous feedbacks from safety reports

1

Total Respondents

8

The results of Question 9 presented all the other comments. Table 31 addressed
the feedback from interviewees. The main idea among those was the free flow of
information between (a) regulatory oversight, (b) management, and (c) employees.
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Table 31
Other Comments.
Answers
CAA
1.
2.
3.
4.

Frequency

Mandate the industry to relay safety information to employees
Information sharing and trust besides regulatory oversight
Effective oversight that helps solving safety issues
Provide assistance for aviation safety

1
3
1
1

Hold safety conference regularly with the industry
Information sharing and trust besides accident investigation

1
1_

ASC
1.
2.

Safety Director
1. Case studies as part of safety audits

1

Quality Assurance
1. QA Notice
2. Confidential safety reports in the training material

2
1

Management
1. Direct channel to CEO through intranet (f=2)
2. Provide disclosure channel with immunity for reporting
safety issues
3. Build up safety culture as top priority

2
1
1

Safety Reward Program
1. Reward people may be a positive way to encourage reporting

1

Total Respondents

8

Demographics
There were a total of nine interviewees, and there was one who did not wish to
respond to the demographic question. Results of demographic data from the remaining
eight interviewees were quantified. All of the respondents were male. The average age
was 44.25. The range of age was from 40 to 48. The average number of years in aviation
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experience was 18.5 with 25 years being the highest and 14 years being the lowest. All
eight respondents had an aviation related bachelor's degree. Also, all of them held CAA
aircraft maintenance certificates, and five of them held FAA A&P certificates. Three
interviewees were senior quality engineers, and five interviewees were managers. Their
responsibilities included (a) inspection, (b) investigation, (c) auditing, (d) training, and (e)
production planning.
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Chapter V
DISCUSSION
The mixed method design used in this research was developed to acquire a
general understanding of Taiwan's aircraft maintenance industry through a quantitative
data collection that was analyzed to identify the reasons for the participants'
understanding of the safety programs. The purpose of the survey was to measure and
examine the attitudes of Taiwanese maintenance personnel associated with voluntary
safety reporting programs. The results were not intended to represent the opinions of all
Taiwanese maintenance personnel; nevertheless, the sampling results represented the
perspective in Taiwan's aircraft maintenance and service organizations. The interview
was designed to obtain information in depth beyond what was possible to acquire from
the survey. The interview was a case study of one single maintenance organization and
characterized the reasons of the survey results.

Knowledge about Voluntary Safety Programs
The first question of the survey was designed to measure participants' knowledge
level of various voluntary safety programs that were widely utilized in the U.S. and
worldwide. The results showed that SMS was known by 55% of participants. Even
though the CAA in Taiwan has published an Advisory Circular (AC) with the guidelines
and mandated that each air carrier must have an SMS program, it is still only known by
half of the respondents in those maintenance organizations. This result shows the lack of
knowledge about SMS among employees in the organization. Nevertheless, the responses
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from the interviews suggested that people acknowledged the benefits of SMS to
significantly reduce the safety incident rate.
ASRS and lOSA were known by 46.4% of respondents. ASRS has been
well-known by the aviation community around the world and recognized as the most
successful voluntary safety reporting program. Since its policy applies to the users in the
NAS alone, the program can only be utilized in the U.S. The accessibility of the safety
information in ASRS was limited for the aviation community in Taiwan. Most of the air
carriers in Taiwan are members of the International Aviation Transportation Association
(IATA). lOSA had been awarded to some of the Taiwanese air carriers and was
recognized by many maintenance organizations in Taiwan. However, not every employee
shared the same knowledge in an organization. In recent years, FOQA has become a
widely accepted voluntary safety program worldwide and was implemented into most of
the Taiwanese air carrier operations. It is not only for flight safety, but also for aircraft
performance monitoring. FOQA involved technical fields in aircraft maintenance; thus, it
was recognized by a number of respondents (27.1%) in the survey.
Overall, the maintenance personnel did have partial knowledge about voluntary
safety programs. Within the Taiwanese air carrier industry, it is believed that only people
with positions directly or partially related to safety have an obligation to familiarize
themselves with these programs. The results of interview did suggest that ICAO, IATA,
and foreign business partners did facilitate some of those programs in Taiwan, such as
SMS and IOSA. The air carrier and MRO facility were required to have them in order to
operate internationally and have contract maintenance from foreign airlines.
Understanding and implementing those voluntary programs was absolutely essential for
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their international business. However, most of the employees were still lacking in
knowledge about those voluntary safety programs.

Understandings of TACARE
The survey showed that over 60% of respondents knew about TACARE, but only
3.6% of them had used it before. Over 90% of respondents believed the importance of
submitting safety reports and showed their willingness to participate the TACARE
system. In the interview, most of the interviewees showed their understandings about
TACARE, but most of their knowledge came from their own readings from TACARE's
website and newsletter. They did not fully understand the policy and functions of
TACARE, which caused them not to submit reports to the TACARE system. Many
participants in this research were not even aware the existence of the TACARE system.
There were a variety of reasons for maintenance personnel not to participate in
TACARE. From the survey data, the unfamiliarity about TACARE's reporting
procedures (n=143) got the highest count of respondents among those reasons. The
interview supported the survey data. Interviewees showed there was very little
information about TACARE for maintenance personnel. There was not enough
promotion from ASC, and TACARE was only known by a small group of people who
had attended ASC's training. Also, there was insufficient safety related information from
TACARE. It did not provide feedback to the participants, and there were no corrective or
preventive action taken after reporting.
Even though the TACARE system was not successful, all the maintenance
organizations in Taiwan had implemented their own in-house reporting programs. The
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in-house reporting program in Taiwan did not resemble the ASAP program in the U.S. air
carrier system. It was mandatory for employees to submit a report after a noticeable
incident involved property damage or personnel injury. The program did not provide any
confidentiality and immunity for the reporter. The company punished unacceptable
behaviors with disciplinary actions and rewarded the achievement of good safety records.
However, the interviewees believed that the company did have a fair and just
investigation for each incident. There were specific committees to address different safety
issues, and then corrective or preventive measures were taken rapidly. The interview
showed that those in-house incident reports have helped improve safety in many ways.
The strength of having a safety reporting program was well-acknowledged by
interviewees.

Safety Culture in Taiwanese Maintenance Organization
Safety culture is comprised of (a) Just Culture, (b) reporting culture, and (c)
learning culture. A well-developed voluntary safety program requires a healthy safety
culture to support it as the foundation of trust between the authority and participants. As
the results of the survey and interview showed, culture issues remain a great threat for
establishing a voluntary safety reporting program in Taiwan.
In the results of the survey, over 80% of respondents have not heard of the term
"Just Culture." Among the respondents, only 13.2% of them believed that they
understood the concepts of Just Culture. The qualitative data from the interview also
demonstrated the same result. All of the interviewees had not heard of Just Culture and
were not able to describe any of its concepts. The interview results did show that the
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company has its own safety policy for incident and accident investigation. There were
safety committees to review the material from in-house reporting programs and to take
actions toward resolving the problems. Some interviewees thought the company
demonstrated fair judgments with punishment and reward. The problem was that the
company has full authority to define the terms and conditions in the Just Culture; hence,
the employees did not fully recognize the line between acceptable and unacceptable
behaviors. In summary, both the survey and interview indicated that the maintenance
personnel in Taiwan do not receive and understand the concepts of just culture
completely.
Most of the respondents (73.9%) in the survey showed that it is everyone's
responsibility to report safety problems and help ensure the safety of maintenance
operations. However, people did not show their full confidence in a voluntary reporting
program. Many believed that only the CAA or the company have the authority for
confidentiality and immunity. There were existing conflicts between the functions of
TACARE, the company's Quality Assurance (QA) system, and the CAA's oversight.
Although the CAA has drafting a legislation to provide confidentiality and immunity to
the participants in the TACARE system, the fear of the consequences toward the
company and the individual still remained. Unless there is solid protection in place,
people would remain passive and conservative about sharing mistakes and experiences.
Most of the respondents in the survey also believed that the CAA and ASC should
be held accountable for the TACARE system. However, the results of the interview
showed that both the CAA and ASC did not provide any feedback to the participants or
action toward the safety issue. There were no physical improvements from the TACARE
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system, which resulted in the lack of interest for people to utilize the system. Although
each organization already has its own reporting system, there were still problems in
relaying safety information. The information from the in-house reporting system was
only shared within the company. There was no effective channel and platform (e.g., the
ASIAS in the U.S.) to share safety information between the aviation industry, CAA, and
ASC. Also, the lack of data in the TACARE system made it impossible to conduct long
term research about safety issues; thus, the TACARE system was not able to make
continuous safety improvement.

The Influences of Chinese Culture
Chinese culture had been the overall factor that influences the establishment of
safety culture in the TACARE system. The culture dominates everything at both the
social and organizational levels, which becomes the major challenge in Just Culture,
reporting culture, and learning culture. As Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (1978) defined, the
characteristics of Chinese culture were (a) high Power Distance (PD), (b) collectivism, (c)
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), and (d) masculinity. The results from both the survey and
interview showed those characteristics dominate the culture in those maintenance
organizations and have major influences on the success of voluntary reporting.
The high Power Distance (PD) in Taiwanese society still exists. Subordinates treat
their superiors with high respect and are not in a position to question their superiors'
decisions in the organization. Thus, the mechanics or operators are reluctant to report any
safety problems they found since they believe it is not their responsibility. The same
principle also applied to the relationship between the authority and company. This
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supported the finding from the interviews whereby maintenance organizations encourage
their employees to report any safety problem to their in-house safety reporting system
first. People would choose to report to TACARE only if the company could not be
trusted.
In Taiwanese society, collectivism made people reluctant to "snitch" on someone
and break the harmony of the group. It also created a tremendous social pressure about
any public event, especially for any aircraft accident or incident. The CAA and ASC were
often under the pressure of the politics and the media. Consequently, this also put a
company or an individual contributing to the safety problem under huge pressure, which
interfered with the investigation of the problem. This social pressure also evolved into a
shame culture making an individual or an organization sensitive to losing its reputation.
People were afraid that their mistakes would be made known to the public. Therefore, an
individual would be generally reluctant to voluntarily submit an incident report to the
company or the TACARE system. The maintenance organization would also refuse to
release safety information related to an incident caused by its own employees to the CAA,
ASC, or other company.
The characteristics previously mentioned also form a punishment culture in
Taiwanese society. Many survey respondents and interviewees expressed their fear of
disciplinary action by their companies as a result of submitting TACARE reports. Unlike
Western cultures where disciplinary actions were the last resource of corrective actions,
in Taiwan, punishment has often been the only solution to most problems regardless of
the root causes. In fact, the punishment culture had not concentrated on identifying the
root cause of a problem, but utilized forms of punishment to prevent further similar
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occurrences. As a result, this action contributed to the difficulty of implementing a
voluntary reporting program, such as TACARE.
In the aviation industry, the composition in gender resulted in masculinity. The
characteristics in competitiveness, assertiveness, and ambition resulted in the aggressive
actions in the career, which may jeopardize safety by poor decision making. However,
Chinese culture still has a code of honor. People desire to achieve great things and stand
out as the leader in the group.

The Acceptance on the Terms of Voluntary Reporting
In the survey, there were a series of Likert-type-scale questions about the
possibility of adopting ASAP principles into the TACARE system. By accepting those
principles, the TACARE system might be able to improve its overall effectiveness. The
majority of respondents (96.5%) believed that a well-organized voluntary reporting
program would enhance safety. This indicated most of the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan understood the value and importance of a voluntary reporting program. Most of
the respondents (93.5%) also agreed that the program should provide protections for
reporter's personal information. Although both the TACARE system and in-house
reporting programs did not establish the legal protections about reporter's information,
confidentiality was highly recognized as one of the means to improve the participation of
the TACARE system.
For the concept of event reviewing, over 97% of the respondents agreed that
safety reports should be reviewed by a group of aviation safety experts and investigators.
This result was consistent with the information gained from the interview. Interviewees
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suggested that the company has various committees (e.g., human factors, environment,
and health) to review the incident reports from its in-house reporting program, and the
preventive or corrective actions were taken rapidly afterward. However, there was no
evidence showing that the TACARE system has a well-functioned Event Review
Committee (ERC) similar to the ASAP program, which is consisted of subject matter
experts. Thus, the TACARE system was not able to collaborate with the CAA and the
industry, determine the root cause of an incident, and develop solutions to prevent
reoccurrence. The survey also investigated the participants' attitude regarding the
inclusion of an employee representative on the ERC. The acceptance of this concept was
slightly lower than other agreements. In Taiwanese aviation industry, there was no
official form of unions among those aviation firms. The concept of having representatives
to negotiate terms with the company was very weak, especially for maintenance
personnel. As a result, the respondents of the survey showed that an employee
representative may not necessarily be included in the ERC to stand for the reporters in the
program.
The concept of defining acceptable and unacceptable behaviors was accepted by
most of the respondents. In a Just Culture, acceptable behaviors were being tolerated, and
unacceptable behaviors were treated with disciplinary actions. Most of the respondents in
the survey agreed that there should be a fine line between unintentional accidents or slips
and intentional acts. However, the acceptance of immunity for acceptable behavior and
punishment for unacceptable behaviors was relatively low. Since the concepts of Just
Culture were not fully understood and accepted by the maintenance personnel in Taiwan,
the punishment culture still dominated the process of accident or incident investigation.
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The final part asked if unanimous consensus must be reached by all members of
the ERC on a safety report. In order to ensure a fair judgment during investigation, this
was a critical principle for an ASAP program. The ERC should consist of the
representatives from the FAA, the management, and the employee. Unanimous consensus
signified all participating parties were in agreement with necessary actions toward a
safety report. Since the maintenance personnel in Taiwan did not fully understand this
principle, the acceptance was slightly lower (83.6%) than other common principles (e.g.,
confidentiality) for a voluntary reporting program. Overall, the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan accepted and agreed with the ASAP principles. The survey results confirmed the
possibility of adapting ASAP principles into the TACARE system.

Demographics
In the Taiwan aviation industry, the male had dominated over the female as the
vast majority of aircraft maintenance personnel are male. This showed that the entire
population of maintenance personnel in Taiwan was under influence of Chinese culture.
In the comparison between survey questionnaire and demographics, one significant
difference was found. There was a positive trend in the relationship of aviation
experience level and the knowledge of Just Culture. The result of this comparison showed
that the percentage of respondents who knew Just Culture is 12.33% in the level of 0-10
years and 33.70% in the level of over 21 years. This trend was caused by the diverse time
that respondents work in the aviation industry. With longer time in the industry, the
maintenance personnel in Taiwan tend to receive more and various training and education,
which lead them to have more opportunities to hear about Just Culture.

The survey results indicated that most of the respondents (n=481) received their
maintenance training from the company itself. The primary contributing reason was
Taiwan's educational system. There were only three universities that offer the same
aviation-related program - Aerospace Engineering, and few colleges have programs
related to aircraft maintenance or avionics. Moreover, there were only a few elective
courses regarding safety in those academic institutions that were aviation-related.
Students were usually not urged by professors to take these courses. The main reason is
that these safety-related courses have been recognized as less important and not relevant
to aerospace engineering. National Cheng Keng University is the only university in
Taiwan that provides safety-related courses at the graduate level. However, the program
lacks in materials and resources about aviation safety compared to programs in the U.S.,
and there were also limited number of students. As a result, the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan often did not receive formal initial training regarding safety. Most of them were
recruited from non-aviation professions and entered the company with less than adequate
knowledge in aviation.
Since the CAA in Taiwan does not mandate that all maintenance workers be
required to have a maintenance certificate to perform maintenance on aircraft, the
numbers of respondents who hold maintenance certificates was low. Half of respondents
(n=305) hold CAA's mechanic certificates; among them, only 79 respondents also hold
FAA's A&P certificates. This discrepancy resulted from different training sources. In
Taiwan's maintenance organization, the mechanics usually gained their certificates as
they have more experience, and the formal training for certificate qualification was
sponsored by the company. Holding a certificate often meant more responsibility as an
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inspector or supervisor who signs off the work. However, the differences in the
company's training for each employee resulted in the inconsistencies among employees
regarding the knowledge of safety.

Chapter VI
CONCLUSIONS
A voluntary safety reporting program, such as the TACARE system, has proven
to be an effective way to improve safety. It is not just identifying human's unsafe acts,
but also providing a better view of the latent risks that lead to those unsafe acts. The
TACARE system signifies Taiwan's efforts to improve aviation safety proactively,
instead of reactively investigating aircraft accident. Even though the industry recognized
the importance and benefits of having a voluntary safety reporting program, there was
only minimum participation in the TACARE system, especially for aircraft maintenance
personnel. The following conclusions demonstrate the reasons of little utilization by
maintenance personnel in Taiwan and also their acceptance on the concepts of a
voluntary safety reporting program.
One of the principalfindingsfromboth the quantitative and qualitative research
was that the maintenance personnel in Taiwan lacked knowledge about voluntary safety
programs. Even if the programs (e.g., TACARE, SMS, and IOSA) have been established
for years in the Taiwanese aviation industry, there are still a lot of people who do not
know anything about them. The research also suggested that many maintenance
personnel in Taiwan were unfamiliar about TACARE's reporting procedures, which
caused them not to submit a safety report to this system. People did not receive
information about the TACARE system or other voluntary safety programs. Also, the
majority of people did not know about the concepts of Just Culture, which are considered
as the foundation of all voluntary safety programs. In other words, the ASC did not
promote the TACARE system and educate on the concepts of the Just Culture
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successfully, and the companies did not offer sufficient training about voluntary safety
programs to all of their employees.
Secondly, the participants in this research revealed that there was no feedback to
the reporter after reports were submitted to the TACARE system and no improvement
from the results of the TACARE reports. Therefore, even if some of maintenance
personnel were aware of the TACARE system, they are still reluctant to participate in the
system. The fear of punishment still exists among the maintenance personnel in Taiwan
as well. Since no legislation about the protections and immunity to the participants x>f the
TACARE system were implemented, there is no immunity or guarantee for non-punitive
actions toward the reporters. The safety policies in those maintenance organizations in
Taiwan were also unclear to their employees. Thus, both the authorities (e.g., the CAA
and ASC) and those maintenance organizations are still under the influences of Chinese
culture.
Finally, the results of this research indicated that the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan are willing to adopt the principles of the ASAP program into the TACARE
system. However, they had not receive information about the ASAP program before and
were not able to understand those principles, such as confidentiality and the ERC. The
results of demographics showed that most of the maintenance personnel in Taiwan only
received the training from their companies. There is no formal aircraft maintenance
training school in Taiwan, which offers the initial training and allows the candidates to be
certified by the CAA. The education in safety within the Taiwanese educational system is
also limited for aviation professions. Therefore, most of the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan did not receive enough knowledge of the safety in aircraft maintenance.
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Chapter Vll
RECOMMENDATIONS
Through the TACARE system, SMS, and the companies' in-housevreporting
programs, the CAA, ASC, and the aircraft maintenance industry have been taking steps to
create a proactive safety reporting system. From the results of this research, the
researcher found that several actions could be taken to enhance the safety in aircraft
maintenance and achieve the full potential of the TACARE system.
Maintenance personnel in Taiwan lack knowledge about the TACARE system
and other voluntary safety programs. It is recommended that educating maintenance
personnel to a certain knowledge level regarding voluntary safety programs is considered
essential. The CAA should also standardize the criteria for certification of aircraft
maintenance personnel. There should be formal aircraft maintenance training schools
providing initial training with basic safety knowledge. Every mechanic should go through
the aircraft maintenance training first and then be certified by the CAA as an aircraft
mechanic. The maintenance organizations should also offer more formal and recurrent
training on safety, such as SMS, Just Culture, and case studies from voluntary safety
programs.
Proper safety courses should be provided by the aviation related education
institutions in Taiwan. Since the aircraft maintenance industry lacks information on the
concepts of voluntary safety programs, the education system in Taiwan should provide
more programs about aviation safety and cooperate with the industry closely to supply
sufficient safety specialists into the workforce. With more and more education on
voluntary safety programs, the maintenance organizations in Taiwan would be able to
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incorporate some of the principles more easily; then, the maintenance personnel in
Taiwan would be more willing to accept and participate in those voluntary safety
programs.
Instead of overseeing the maintenance organizations in Taiwan through
inspections and accident or incident investigations, the CAA and ASC should emphasize
their efforts on promoting the concepts of voluntary reporting to let more people
understand the functions of the TACARE system. The CAA and ASC should hold safety
conferences regularly and provide the latest safety information for all maintenance personnel. There also should be a direct medium of exchange between the authorities and
the industry to share safety information. Perhaps a platform like ASIAS in the U.S would
serve as a bridge between the TACARE system and those companies' in-house reporting
programs and would be beneficial to increase the overall effectiveness of safety
enhancement.
In addition, the CAA and ASC should put the legislation of voluntary reporting in
place as soon as possible to provide protections to its participants and establish a
non-punitive environment in aircraft maintenance industry. Due to the characteristics of
masculinity in Chinese culture, one can also consider a way to reward a group or
individual for participating in the system. By giving a reward to an individual or a group
with distinguished performance, one could be considered as a respectful person who
reaches great achievements in one's career. Instead of punishing with disciplinary actions,
a mechanism of rewarding participants in the TACARE system would be feasible and
might increase the willingness of participation.
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Dear Participants,

I am a graduate student of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona
Beach, Florida, USA. I am studying voluntary incident reporting programs for
maintenance personnel, and I would greatly appreciate your input to my survey. I realize
that you are very busy; and completion of the survey should require not more than 10-35
minutes of your time. Please return the completed survey to the survey collection box.

This survey is designed to examine the effectiveness of voluntary incident
reporting programs for maintenance personnel. All the information will be treated
confidentially and reported in the aggregate. The resultant data will be analyzed as part of
my master degree's thesis. I will strictly respect the confidentiality of all participants'
input. If you are a participant, and if you desire, I will provide you with a copy of the
outcomes of my study. Please return the survey with your business card or contact
information to indicate your interest in receiving a copy of the results.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,
Yi-Fan (Tom) Chen
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL, U.S.A.
Master of Science in Aeronautics Graduate Student
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TACARE Survey
Question 1 and 2 is inquiry about the knowledge of voluntary safety programs.
1. Which U.S. voluntary safety program(s) are you familiar with? Please select all the following
safety reporting program(s) that you have heard about or utilized. (Choose all that apply.)
a. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
b. Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
c. Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA)
d. Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)
e. Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)
f. Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP)
g. Internal Evaluation Program (IEP)
h. Safety Management System (SMS)
i. IATA Operations Safety Audit (IOSA)
2.Have you heard of the term "Just Culture"?
a. Yes. (Please proceed to question 2-A and the followings)
b. No. (Please proceed to question 3)
2-A. Do you feel you are well-educated on the concepts of Just Culture?
a. Yes.
b. No.
Question 3-6 consist of inquiries regard the usage of TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety
REporting (TACARE) system.
3. Are you familiar with the TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting system (TACARE)?
a. Yes, and 1 have used it
c. No, I am not aware of TACARE
b. Yes, but 1 have not used it
d. No, it is no importance to me
4. Do you think it is important to submit a report to TACARE in the event of a maintenance error?
a. Yes
(Please proceed to question 5-A and 6 through 15)
b. No
(Please proceed to question 5-B and 6 through 15)
5-A. Who do you believe should have the responsibility to submit reports to TACARE in the
event of a
maintenance error?
a. Supervisor
b. Mechanic or operator
c. Inspector
d. Anyone who saw the problem
5-B. 1 am reluctant to participate in TACARE because (Select any/all that apply from the list
below):
a. The probability of disciplinary action(s) from my airline
b. The lack of confidence on the immunity of TACARE system
c. My unfamiliarity with the TACARE reporting procedures
d. I do not believe a submission of a TACARE report would not improve flight safety
e. The company has its own reporting procedure, so TACARE is irrelevant.
f. Other reason(s) for choosing not to participate:
(Please be specific)
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6. Who do you believe should be in charge of the confidential data collected by TACARE?
a. Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
c. Aviation Safety Council (ASC)
b. Independent non-govemment agency
d. The air carrier
Questions 7-15 consist of general statements regarding the concept of voluntary incident
reporting program, please respond to each statement below by circling the choice best
described your feeling.
l=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3= Disagree, 4= Strongly Disagree.
A well-organized voluntary incident reporting
program enhances flight safety.
8. The information in incident reports should be
de-identified and remain anonymous for the public.
9. Confidential incident reports should be reviewed
by a team of safety experts and investigators.
10. An employee representative should be included
as part of the incident report review team.
11. The organization should draw a line and define
what are acceptable (human errors and at-risk
behaviors) and unacceptable (reckless) behaviors.
12. Participants who committed human errors or
at-risk behaviors should be protected from legal
and airline disciplinary actions.
13. The program should not accept and provide
immunity for reckless behaviors.
14. Unanimous consensus must be reached by all
members of the incident report review team on
event reported.
15. The program should create rapid, useful,
accessible, and intelligible feedbacks to the
reporting community.
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Demographics
16. Gender
a. Male

b. Female

17. Nationality
a. Taiwanese/Chinese
18. What is your age?
a. 18-30

b. Foreign National

b. 31-40

c. 41-50

d. 51-60

e. 61 +

19. How many years of aircraft maintenance experience do you have?
a. 0-10
b. 11-20
c o v e r 20
20. Source of primary training?
a. Military
b. Airline training program
c. Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) training school
d. College
e. Other:

(Please specify)

21. What maintenance license or certificate do you currently hold? (Choose all that apply.)
a. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) Certificate
b. Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) Mechanic License
c. None.
d. Other(s):
(Please specify)
22. What area of ground operations are you serving in?
a. Line maintenance
b. Hangar maintenance
c. Shop maintenance
d. Ground services and Ramp operations
e. Other:
(Please specify)
23. Which title best describes your job position?
a. Manager
b. Supervisor
c. Mechanic/Operator
d. Other:
_ _ (Please specify)
24. Will you interest in the results of this research project?
a. Yes. (Please write down your e-mail:
b. No.
NOTE: If you have any comments, please feel free to utilize the back(s) ofthepage(s). If your
comments are specific to a question, please include a reference to the question number. Once
again: Thank you for your participation!
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APPENDIX B
THE CHINESE VERSION OF THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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APPENDIX C
THE ENGLISH VERSION OF
THE OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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The TAiwan Civil Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) System
in Aircraft Maintenance
Dear Participants,
1 am a graduate student of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona
Beach, Florida, USA. 1 am studying voluntary incident reporting programs for
maintenance personnel, and 1 would greatly appreciate your input to my research. I am
currently conducting interviews with experts in the area of voluntary safety reporting
programs. You have been identified as a possible participant in the study.
This interview is designed to examine the effectiveness of voluntary incident
reporting programs for maintenance personnel in Taiwan. All the information will be
treated confidentially and reported in the aggregate. The resultant data will be analyzed as
part of my master degree's thesis. 1 will strictly respect the confidentiality of all
participants" input. If you are a participant and if you desire, I will provide you with a
copy of the outcomes of my study.
The interview is designed to be approximately 15 minutes long, and the interview
questions are attached for your review. If you are available, 1 would like to set up a time
to be in contact with you that would best suit your schedule. If you are willing to
participate, please inform me of your best time and the phone number for contacting you.
1 look forward to speaking with you and sincerely appreciate your time and effort.
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
Yi-Fan (Tom) Chen
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL, U.S.A.
Master of Science in Aeronautics Graduate Student
chencanq30 a hotmail a>in
chen\ a m\ erau edit

Interview Topics
1. Are you familiar with the TACARE system? If yes, please describe your
understanding.

2. If you know about the TACARE system, what is your opinion of the effectiveness of
the TACARE system? (If not applicable, please skip to Question 3)

3. What improvements have you observed in your company's safety culture'and
operations since the implementation of the in-house safety reporting system?

4. Can you provide examples to show the positive changes in safety culture within your
company after implementing the Safety Management System (SMS)?

5. What are your thoughts concerning the incorporation of a voluntary safety reporting
program, such as the TACARE system, into maintenance and ramp safety?
A. Challenges
B. Advantages

C. Concerns

6. Are you familiar with the concept of "Just Culture?" If yes, please describe your
understanding.

7. Does your company have a safety policy for voluntary incident reporting? If it does,
please describe the level of trust on the just and confidentiality between the
management and employees.

8. What education or training program(s) do you think would be needed to improve
safety culture when implementing a voluntary safety program?

9. Please provide suggestions on any of the items below that involve aviation safety
programs.
A. Civil Aviation Administration (CAA):
B. Aviation Safety Council (ASC):
C. Company's Safety Committee:
D. Safety Director:
E. Quality Assurance:
F. The Management:
G. Safety Rewarding Program:
H. Other:
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Demographics of interviewee:
Gender
Age
Source of and level of Education
Professional Certificate(s)
Years of Aviation Experience
Job Title
Main Responsibility
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APPENDIX D
THE CHINESE VERSION OF
THE OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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